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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, the world has debated the idea of biofuels as a 
solution to energy security, energy independence, and global climate 
change.  However, as the biofuels movement has unfolded, crucial issues 
emerged regarding biofuels efficacy and efficiency.  The deployment of 
biofuels of marginal benefit has raised questions about how countries like 
the USA may have found themselves so invested in a potentially failing 
technology.  In order to better understand and evaluate these issues, this 
study utilizes the Ostrom Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework to better evaluate these issues and analyze interacting 
institutions that shape US biofuel policy.  The IAD framework is a model 
that enables one to study, conceptualize, compare, and make connections 
across decision arenas that would otherwise be distinct from each other.  
By analyzing the interactions of relevant institutions, one can see how 
different dynamic interests interacted to shape biofuel policy in the USA 
today. Conclusions from this analysis include:  the IAD framework is ideal 
for analyzing the political and economic case for biofuels.  The five action 
arenas identified in this thesis are sufficient to understand corn bioethanol 
policy.  A compelling case for supporting bioethanol is not made.  An 
international agreement to reduce GHG emissions could change the 
landscape for biofuels.  Finally, there is little prospect for biofuels playing 
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a significant role in the near term without greater alignment among the 
action arenas.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Biofuels Debate 
In 2007, the US Congress took a big step toward meeting the challenge of 
energy security by passing the “Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007”.  
The Act was signed into law on December 19, 2007, and began implementation 
on January 1, 2008.  A key provision of the Act was a major expansion of the 
renewable fuel standard (RFS) to 36 billion gallons a year of ethanol by 2022, 
with no more than 15 billion gallons coming from corn or other grains and no less 
than 21 billion gallons coming from cellulosic feedstock in that final year.  This 
Act built on an equally ambitious law passed just two years earlier - the “Energy 
Policy Act of 2005”.  It was the first to mandate a renewable fuel phase-in called 
the renewable fuels standard (RFS).  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 also created 
the Cellulosic Biomass Program to encourage the production of cellulosic ethanol.   
The United States is not alone in its support for biofuels.  Very much in 
parallel to US efforts, the European Union was enacting its own directives in 
support of biofuels.  The European Biofuels Directive of 2003 (2003/30/EC) set a 
target of 2% biofuels by 2005 (which was not met), and a target of 5.75% biofuels 
by 2010 (European Parliament 2003).  This directive was extended at the 
European Council meeting of March 2007.  The European Heads of States and 
Governments endorsed a binding target of securing a 20% share for renewable 
energy in overall EU energy consumption by 2020; and a 10% binding minimum 
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target to be achieved by all Member States for the share of biofuels in overall EU 
transport petrol and diesel consumption by 2020 (European Parliament 2003).  In 
relative terms, Brazil is even more ambitious in its goals for biofuels.  The 
majority of Brazilian fuel is gasohol which was governmentally mandated at 23% 
ethanol in 2006 (Marris 2006).  
Yet, even as legislation, directives, and targets were being instituted, a 
global controversy emerged around the entire concept of biofuels.  On the one 
hand, a number of researchers in government, academia, research institutes, civil 
society, and business provided strong arguments for biofuels as a public good for 
the United States specifically and the world more generally.  For example, 
biofuels could reduce dependence on foreign oil improving energy security 
(Mazurek 2005, Sims et al. 2006, Charles et al. 2007), and reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions which is good for the environment (Charles et al. 2007, Sims et 
al. 2006) .  Biofuels when used on degraded lands could increase wildlife habitat, 
amplify carbon sequestration into soils, and improve water quality (Tilman et al. 
2009).  Biofuels could also drive more investment in rural areas and create new 
markets for agricultural products.  They are, therefore, good for rural 
development, reducing poverty and migration into cities. They could also benefit 
food production (Charles et al. 2007, Boddiger 2007).  Additionally, biofuels are 
attractive because they utilize existing distribution infrastructure and supply 
chains (Hoogma et al 2002, Charles et al 2007).  Shapouri et al. (2002) and Marris 
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(2006) pointed out that corn and sugar cane ethanol produces more energy than it 
consumes and is thereby net energy positive.   
At the same time,  some of the benefits of biofuels have been questioned, 
particularly concerning the impacts on food production as well as both direct and 
indirect land use change.  For example, biofuel production may lead to increased 
deforestation, and has been linked to increased food prices (Boddiger 2007, 
Tilman et al. 2009).  Land use change significantly decreases biodiversity (Tilman 
et al. 2009; Costa and Foley, 1998; Fritsche et al., 2006).  Additionally, Righelato 
and Spracklen (2007) pointed out that land clearing causes rapid oxidation of 
stored carbon in vegetation and soil.  This creates a large up-front emission cost 
that would out-weigh the avoided emissions for many years.  Instead, Righelato 
and Spracklen (2007) encouraged reforestation of an equivalent area of land 
which would sequester two to nine time more carbon over 30 years than avoided 
emissions from biofuel use.  
Still other studies indicated that water competition could be exacerbated 
with biofuel production, as both the developed and developing world frequently 
experience intense competition for water between the domestic, industrial, and 
agricultural sectors (Boddiger 2007).  Opponents of first generation biofuels argue 
that when one considers all inputs during stages of production, transportation and 
processing, biofuels are not carbon neutral (Anderson and Fergusson 2006) or 
energy positive (Pimentel 1991, 2003, Patzek and Pimentel 2005, Pimentel 2006).   
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The Energy Acts of 2005 and 2007 were not the first time governments 
enacted policies to support large-scale use of biofuel, nor the first time their 
actions have met with controversy.  The first major step for the United States 
came with the passage of The Energy Tax Act of 1978 which provided for a 40 
cent per gallon tax exemption for production of bioethanol for fuel (McDonald 
1979).  While the primary intent of the legislation was improving energy security 
by enhancing domestic production of an oil substitute, a secondary intent was to 
enhance markets for domestic farm products, especially corn.  Speaking later – 
January 1980 - on the importance of this legislation President Carter said, “Our 
overall gasohol program will spur the investments that we, together, must make 
for a more secure energy future.  We will create new markets for our farmers.  We 
will no longer have to throw away waste materials which can be turned into 
profitable essential fuels.” (Clean Fuels Development Coalition and Ethanol 
Across America 2003). 
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 was passed during a period of extreme 
uncertainty in energy markets.  In October 1973, Arab oil ministers cut oil 
production and embargoed the United States, causing a worldwide energy crisis 
which signaled the beginning of a fundamental shift in the geopolitics of oil.  In 
parallel, the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was formed 
in 1960, began to exert real international influence (OPEC 2009).  Then, in 
December of 1978 the Iranian Revolution shut down oil production and exports 
from Iran, creating the second energy crisis of the decade (Duffield 2008).     
5 
 
The passage of the Energy Tax Act of 1978 also coincided with concern 
for declining corn prices, as production soared following a period of robust 
international demand growth in the early 1970‟s that drove prices to near record 
levels.  By 1977, farm income had once again become a problem, this time 
complicated by the price instability caused by greater reliance on export sales. 
Despite advancing exports, substantially higher grain production in the mid-1970s 
depressed prices.  The corn price fell from $3.02 to $2.02 a bushel between 1974 
and 1977.  A new and domestic demand for corn was more than welcome 
(Bowers et al. 1984). 
Under the circumstances, the biofuel components of the Energy Tax Act 
of 1978 were not especially controversial, but by 1982 questions that are still 
recognizable in the current debate began to emerge.  Among the major concerns 
were the impacts on food costs and the possibility that ethanol production costs 
would never be competitive with oil derived fuels (Johnson and Hollman 1982).  
By 1986, concern about ethanol fuel programs lead the USDA to undertake a 
comprehensive study, which concluded: 
 “The ethanol industry cannot survive during the period studied without 
massive government subsidies, given the outlook for petroleum 
prices.”  
 “Higher corn prices from additional ethanol-induced demand would 
increase the cost of producing beef, pork, and poultry.  Consumer food 
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expenditures would rise by $8.6 billion, or an average of $2.29 for 
each additional gallon of ethanol produced.”  
 Possible improvements in technology through 1995 are unlikely to 
reduce ethanol production costs enough to significantly alter these 
conclusions (Gavett et al. 1986).  
The USDA study was hugely controversial and much maligned especially 
by political figures from farming states (Johnson et al. 2000), and it seems to have 
had little impact on public support for biofuels which remained generally 
favorable.  Nevertheless, the USDA study had the effect of drawing public 
attention to bioethanol and bringing the biofuel debate into sharper political focus.  
More than twenty years later, the debate continues although the details have 
evolved.  This continuing debate of biofuels was a major motivation for this thesis 
research. 
1.2 Objective of this Thesis Work 
The main objective of my thesis research is to address the following 
questions based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework:  
 Why did first generation biofuels enjoy such extensive public and 
political support as late as 2007 and now are met with increasing 
skepticism? 
 There are calls coming from stakeholders to end support for first 
generation biofuels by governments.  What is the justification for a 
shift in policy? 
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 What is the future for biofuels in the United States, and how is it 
related to energy sustainability? 
In the course of my analysis, I will touch on developments in other parts 
of the world especially the European Union and its member states and Brazil as 
these regions have embarked on plans as ambitious in their own right as the US.  
Meaningful activities in other parts of the world cannot be overlooked because oil 
and grain markets are global as is the flow of information – national activities are 
linked through international markets and channels of communication.  
To aid in this exploration I will set the debate into a framework developed 
by Ostrom and coworkers called the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework.  The IAD framework is a powerful general model that can be 
applied quantitatively for simple games, but is also applicable in situations too 
complex to be approached as simple games (Ostrom 2005).  In this case, the 
framework helps to identify participants, the roles they play, and the settings 
(action arenas) in which they will make decisions.  It also helps to clarify linkages 
among action arenas and to show how limitations in knowledge and asymmetric 
access to information lead to tensions among participants and non-participants. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The IAD Framework as a Model for Biofuel Policy 
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework enables one to 
study and conceptualize the process of policy making at different scales.  It guides 
the process of making comparisons, evaluations, and connections across arenas 
that otherwise might be seen as separate and distinct from one another.  In the 
case of biofuels, and especially bioethanol, in the United States, one can see the 
conjoining and influence of substantially independent institutions, which in 
combination exert strong influence on biofuel policy, even though they may not 
have deep and direct interest in the area.  By analyzing the interactions of these 
institutions, one can see how dynamic interests combined to shape biofuel policy 
in the USA today.  Other commonly used models are dynamic simulations, where 
institutions and policy making usually are treated as exogenous variables.  
Institutions and their policies are represented as parameters to be set and 
evaluated for their impacts.  Projections, such as the Energy Information 
Administration‟s Annual Energy Outlook and similar statistical and dynamic 
simulation models (e.g. Threshhold 21, and Aspen) require quantitative data to 
create projections.  But a  challenge exists with dynamic simulation models when 
adequate quantitative data in unavailable. For this study, data for the complex 
interactions regarding US biofuel policy making was not available.  My purpose 
in this thesis is to show how policy making arises by using the IAD framework. 
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The foundational concept behind IAD is the notion that there are an 
underlying set of universal building blocks “that can be used to build useful 
theories of human behavior in a diverse range of situations in which humans 
interact” (Ostrom 2005).  Figure 1 shows the IAD diagrammatically.   
 
Figure 1.  The institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom 2005). 
 
At the center of the IAD framework is the Action Arena.  It is here that 
participants engage in social interactions that lead to outcomes which are subject 
to analysis.  It is important to note that the evaluation criteria need not be, and 
rarely are, the same for all participants.  Consequently, the quality of interactions 
and outcomes are likely judged to be very different by different parties. 
  The Action Arena does not exist in isolation.  Exogenous variables create 
structure around the Action Arena.  Typically, rules may be informal and largely 
culturally driven, but may also be very formal and codified.  In either case, the 
rules will be known to and understood by the participants.  This is not to say that 
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the rules are always perfectly clear and perfectly obeyed – often neither is the 
case, but they will be sufficiently clear and understood to support an Action Arena 
or there would be no Arena (Ostrom 2005).  
Among the rules, typically will be prescriptions that include who are 
legitimate participants, what positions are available, who may occupy them, and 
how interactions may unfold within the arena.  Importantly, not all interested 
parties are automatically participants, nor do they necessarily have equal status.  
Finally, there are biophysical/material conditions, that are in the short term at 
least, beyond the reach of participants to change, that form the physical back drop 
against which participants can gauge their preferred outcomes and action 
strategies.      
The Action Arena itself has structure as shown in Figure 2 below (Ostrom 
2005).  Key features of the internal structure are the participants, positions they 
may occupy (chairman, voters, buyers, sellers, legislator, judge etc.), and actions 
that are available to them.  Participants may be individuals, as for example in a 
legislature or parliament, but they may also be organizations, institutions, 
countries, and businesses.  For example, the international oil and grain markets 
have participants that are individuals, businesses, and countries all playing.  These 
structural elements are linked to and determine the outcome set that is available 
within the action situation.  How the linkage leads to outcomes is determined by 
information available to participants and the control that various participants have 
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over the interaction and crucially the benefits each participant ascribes to potential 
outcomes.   
In complex action situations, information is typically incomplete and held 
asymmetrically.  As Ostrom (2005) pointed out, “When information is less than 
complete, the question of who knows what at what juncture becomes very 
important.”  “When joint outcomes depend on multiple actors contributing inputs 
that are costly and difficult to measure, incentives exist for individuals to behave 
opportunistically” (Ostrom 2005).  As we will see later, incomplete understanding 
of the exogenous biophysical and material conditions, coupled with asymmetric 
information in the action arena, are important contributors to the biofuel debate.   
 
 
Figure 2.  The internal structure of an action situation (Ostrom 2005). 
 
In complex situations, net costs and benefits of any potential outcome are 
assessed differently by different participants.  While it could be assumed that 
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participants have an underlying logic for their cost benefit analysis, it should not 
be assumed that the analysis is complete.  For example, on the cost side, all 
unintended consequences may not be identified or quantified.    
Action situations can also exist at different hierarchical levels (Figure 3).  
The hierarchy recognizes that, in principle, there can be an infinite (though 
practically, considerably less than infinite) number of layers of overview and 
outcomes in structuring rules for action situations.  In Figure 3, four layers are 
identified.  As will be seen later, I will invoke just two layers to describe the 
social and physical dynamic of biofuels.  My analysis will include three collective 
choice arenas – the Federal Government of the United States, the World Trade 
Organization and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and two operational arenas – the global oil and oil products markets and the 
global grain markets. 
Figure 3.  Levels of analysis and outcomes (Ostrom 2005). 
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Finally, as shown in Figure 4, action arenas can be either formal or 
informal.  For the action arenas that I will be considering, the US Federal 
Government is clearly a national, formal collective choice arena, and more 
precisely it is an umbrella for a myriad of arenas (for example, congressional 
committees and regulatory agencies).  The UNFCCC and WTO are international, 
formal collective choice arenas.  The oil and grain markets have elements of both.  
Exchanges (NYMEX) are formally constituted with formal oversight, but it is just 
one of many markets that are linked in practice by largely informal mechanisms, 
as there is no international jurisdiction to oversee them.  This difference will also 
feature in the biofuels debate. 
 
Figure 4.  Relationships of formal and informal collective choice arenas (Ostrom 2005). 
 
2.2 Action Arenas Relevant to Biofuels 
Aside from sugar cane in Brazil, corn ethanol is the only other large scale 
biofuel in production today and likely will be the only one in the foreseeable 
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future.  As I will show in this thesis, the market dynamics for corn ethanol is 
largely driven by policy and legislation of the US Federal Government.  The 
Federal Government is the most important action arena (more accurately umbrella 
for multiple action arenas) affecting the future of corn bioethanol.  But, the 
Government does not act in isolation.  Other action arenas also directly and 
indirectly influence outcomes.  Ethanol as a fuel must in some sense compete with 
petroleum products.  Thus, the dynamic of the oil markets influence outcomes 
regarding ethanol.   The consequences of alternative demand for corn appears as a 
price signal through the grain markets.  Price signals affect grain ethanol 
competitiveness and of course food prices.  The grain markets in turn are 
increasingly being affected by trade liberalization policies driven by the WTO.  
Finally, the overriding importance of climate change, as well as the emissions of 
greenhouse gases associated with fossil fuels, is an important driver in outcomes 
associated with alternative fuels.  The principal driver for climate policy is the 
UNFCCC.   
This suite of action arenas, and the dynamic interaction among them, 
drives the complex web of choices made by consumers and policy makers.  
Additionally, they are the access point to assess the historical development of 
biofuel policy in general, and specifically for corn ethanol in the United States.  
Accordingly, I have chosen the following five action arenas for this analysis:  
1) The US Federal Government: The US Federal Government which can 
be thought of as an umbrella for a myriad of action arenas –including 
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congress, senate, committees, and regulatory agencies to name a few – 
is the primary driver of the  market dynamic for corn ethanol. 
2) Oil-markets:  This action arena was chosen because ethanol as a fuel 
must compete with fuels from petroleum products, and thus the 
dynamic of the oil markets will influence outcomes with respect to 
corn ethanol.  Pricing of oil products are particularly important to the 
competitiveness of corn ethanol and its underlying demand. 
3) Grain market:  Grain markets were chosen since the alternative 
demand for corn appears through the grain markets.  The 
competitiveness of corn ethanol is heavily influenced by the price of 
corn. Additionally, grain markets are of importance because they 
directly influence rural income and food affordability.  
4) UNFCCC:  The UNFCCC was chosen as an action arena because over 
the last few decades, greenhouse gas emissions by fossil fuels has 
emerged as an international policy challenge.  The potential impact of 
those gases on climate, has created a sense of urgency by policy 
makers to find alternatives to fossil fuels and to create policy to 
promote alternatives including biofuels.  The UNFCCC is the principle 
arena for making climate policy. 
5) WTO:  This action arena was chosen because the DOHA round of 
negotiations will likely have a very profound impact on agriculture 
policy in the developed countries.  Prior to the Doha round agricultural 
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policy remained outside of the trade discussions.  However, beginning 
with this new round, developing countries have tied continuing trade 
liberalization in products and services to agriculture reform in the US 
and Europe.  Developing countries are specifically requiring deep cuts 
in farm subsidies in developed countries, especially the US and 
Europe.  Though this round of negotiations have not been completed, 
both Europe and the US have offered deep cuts in farm subsidies.  
Conceivably one could consider others, but I argue that there are no others 
of comparable importance to these five.  I argue this position based on two 
considerations.  First, the US Federal Government complex of action arenas has 
the capacity to explore and regulate across an extraordinarily wide scope, and 
therefore, can in principle accommodate any new relevant developments in 
biofuels.  Second, there are few other action arenas that have both the focus and 
international scope of the WTO, UNFCC, oil markets, and grain markets.  One 
could note for example, the importance of water or land use change in the biofuel 
debate, but there is no national or international action arena unique to either.  
Currently, water and land issues must appear as exogenous variables in one or 
more of the arenas that I have identified, or they don‟t have an easily accessible 
route to the biofuel decision making process. 
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2.2.1 US Government 
 
The first action arena relevant to the biofuels story is the Federal 
Government of the United States (US Federal Government).  The US Federal 
Government action arena is a formal collective choice arena as described in 
Figures 3 and 4.  As such, it has extensive and formal procedural rules, tradition, 
and precedent to guide deliberations and decision making, as well as extensive 
powers to prescribe, invoke, monitor, and enforce.    
Key positions in this action arena are those that can act to make law or 
policy (Figure 5).  Included are Congress and its committees and caucuses, the 
President and relevant Cabinet departments, and the implementing and oversight 
agencies that have the power to direct.  I exclude the Judicial Branch, as they have 
not featured large in the biofuel debate.  Participants are elected in the case of the 
President and members of Congress.  Congress selects committee heads and 
members from among its own membership.  Cabinet heads and heads of agencies 
are appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. 
Among the Congressional committees of particular note are the 
Agriculture Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee in the House 
of Representative.  Those committees of relevance within the senate include the 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee and the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee.  These committees are responsible for drafting legislation 
related to energy and agriculture.  The Committee Chairpersons that lead these 
committees play a central role in guiding legislation through the House and 
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Senate and occupy key positions.  The Cabinet Departments, the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Agriculture, are also substantial positions as is the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  As will be seen later, at various times, the 
participants that occupy these positions have all played major roles in shaping 
biofuels policy.   
 
Figure 5.  The internal structure of US Government action situation (Ostrom 2005). 
 
There are many individuals and institutions that have considerable interest 
in the deliberations and decisions of the Federal Government (business, lobbyists, 
state and local governments, non-governmental organizations etc.), but they are 
not participants in the action arena.  They form part of the biophysical and 
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material context for the US Federal Government action arena and provide 
information about linkages to outcomes and in some instances, e.g. lobbyists, 
attempt to exert influence.  But the actual positions and participants are the much 
smaller group above (Figure 5).   
This is not to suggest that the other actors in other positions are not 
influential.  Many are, but they exert their influence indirectly through context, 
and their ability to persuade actual participants.  Gawande and Hoekman (2006), 
for example, looked at lobbying and agriculture policy in the United States.  
Following earlier work, which presumed that government participants trade off 
their personal interests with the costs that their policies impose on society, and 
using the Grossman-Helpman political economy model, the authors showed that 
the size and targeting of political campaign contributions could be understood 
from the equation below: 
G = aW + C 
where G is government policy, W is general welfare, C is campaign contribution, 
and a is the weight the government puts on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar 
of contributions.  In other words, the government is prepared to trade off welfare 
loss imposed on consumers by its policies for campaign contributions by those 
who stand to gain from those policies.  Given the size of welfare (W), the weight 
given to a welfare dollar (a) would need to be surprisingly small for contributions 
(C) to have any impact at all. 
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Citing Freidman (2003), Gawande and Hoekman (2006) put deadweight 
economic losses from grain crop subsidies in 2002 at between $2 and $6 billion, 
while campaign contributions in the period from Farm Political Action 
Committees (PACs) were estimated at only about $5 to $7 million.  This 
discrepancy in scale was explained by noting first that PAC money was highly 
targeted.  In the 1993 – 1994 election cycle, Chairmen of the Agriculture 
Committees of the House and Senate were preferentially targeted, as were 
subcommittee chairmen.  In some cases, the proportion of contributions from 
Agriculture PACs made up a substantial proportion of the candidate‟s campaign 
funds.    
The second key factor in explaining the large discrepancy arises just as 
suggested by the Ostrom model.  Contributions are made in advance of 
legislation.  Powerful participants in important positions have a measure of 
control over the outcome (see Figure 5), but not absolute control.  As Gawande 
and Hoekman  put it, “Thus protection is for sale, but uncertainly, because 
lobbying contributions are made in advance of knowing the outcome.”  Given the 
uncertainties, contributions nearly 3 orders of magnitude less than the welfare cost 
are enough. 
2.2.2 Oil and Oil Products Markets 
The second action arena important for biofuels is the oil and oil products 
market.  This action arena is not well defined nor formally organized, though 
elements of it, exchanges for example, are.  It is a self-organized, operational 
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arena of the type shown in Figure 4.  A full description of the oil and oil products 
market is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Nevertheless, a brief description of the 
essential features will aid in understanding the nature of this action arena and 
especially how it links to other action arenas important to biofuels. For more a 
extensive review of oil markets the book “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, 
Money and Power” by Daniel Yergin is a good resource. 
The oil market is in fact many markets ranging from private and often 
confidential transactions between two parties (over-the-counter) to well organized 
and regulated exchanges (Table 1).  The different markets tend to be regional, but, 
because oil can and does move globally, prices equilibrate globally (Mileva and 
Siegfried 2007).  Thus, regional markets are connected through physical 
movement of products between regions.  This interconnectivity makes the market 
very flexible, but it also means that no national jurisdiction can regulate the entire 
market.    
 
Table 1.  International oil exchanges.  Note that oil products are traded on many more 
exchanges around the world (Mileva and Siegfried 2007). 
Exchange Location Start Date 
New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX ) 
New York, United 
States 
1983 
International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) London, United 
Kingdom 
1998 
Tokyo Commodity Exchange 
(TOCOM) 
Tokyo, Japan 2001 
Multi Commodity Exchange of India Mumbai, India 2005 
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Within national borders, governments can and do exert great influence on 
the oil market by, for example, regulating exchanges (NYMEX in the US), 
levying taxes or imposing tariffs, controlling monopolies, establishing strategic 
reserves, supporting exploration within their borders, imposing environmental 
regulations, and funding research into alternatives (Mileva and Siegfried 2007).  
Few of these actions, however, extend beyond national borders.  The result is an 
action arena with a myriad of participants ranging from private individuals trading 
through exchanges, to the fully integrated multinational oil companies, to the 
monopoly aggregate of exporting states - OPEC (Figure 6), but no single entity 
can exert controlling influence.  In fact, as evidenced by the debate following the 
surge and then collapse of oil prices between 2004 and 2009, not only is no single 
entity able to dominate the oil market, but also it is unclear what the key factors in 
determining price actually are (Hamilton 2009). 
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Figure 6.  Participant structure of oil market action arena. 
 
2.2.3 Grain Markets Participants and Positions 
World grain markets are large, international, complex, and heavily 
influenced by government policy.  The full grain value chain can be broken into 
five parts; 1)  input suppliers of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and the like, 2)  
producers (farmers), 3)  aggregation and distribution companies 4)  processors 
and 5)  food product retailers.  In addition, an array of exchanges and trading 
companies that support export and import of grain and facilitate steps in the chain 
especially aggregation and distribution.  The nature of participants in this chain 
varies greatly, ranging from very small family farms and retail outlets to 
multinational agribusiness to government controlled trading firms.  
The most fragmented and diverse part of the chain is the producers.  The 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2007 Farm Census counted 2,204,792 
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farms in the United States, a net increase of 300,000 farms from the 2002 census 
(USDA 2007).  In order to partially offset the diminished economic power that 
comes from lack of concentration, producers have joined together in cooperatives.  
These organizations are also diverse and provide a range of services to producers 
including sales and marketing of farm products and procurement of materials and 
services for production.  Typically, cooperatives are not for profit and exist only 
to reduce farm costs and increase farm revenues.  The USDA 2007 census 
counted nearly 2600 cooperatives in the US, with gross business revenue of $147 
billion (USDA 2007).   
At the other extreme, some of the large agribusiness firms are highly 
integrated and participate in more than one part of the chain.  The US agribusiness 
company Cargill for example, employs 160,000 people in 67 countries with 
products and services shown in Table 2 below.  Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), 
another US based agribusiness company, has 27,000 employs and operates in 60 
countries.  Its products and services are also shown in Table 2.  These two 
companies, along with Continental Grain and European counterparts, Bunge and 
Louis Dreyfus, play an especially important role in the international grain trade.  
Because they are all privately held firms, it is hard to get accurate numbers for the 
true scale of their operations, but Hayenga and Wisner (2000) estimate that in the 
late 1990s two firms, Cargill and Continental Grain, accounted for 35% of U.S. 
grain and oilseeds exports.  Another trading company, Louis Dreyfus, exported 
15% of total world grain overall. 
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Table 2.  Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) products and services (Cargill 2010, Archer 
Daniels Midland Company 2010). 
Cargill ADM 
Animal Nutrition & Feed Food 
Commodity Trading & Processing Feed 
Industrial / BioIndustrial Fuel 
Energy & Fuels Industrials 
Farmer Services Brands 
Financial & Risk Management Grain Merchandising 
Food & Beverage Suppliers 
Foodservice Transportation 
Pharma & Personal Care Global Services 
Salt  
In the supply of seeds and agricultural inputs, other large companies are 
important participants.  For example, Monsanto and Dow supply 45% of maize 
seeds to the world excluding China (ETC Group 2003).  Monsanto also sold the 
seed for 88% of the total area planted in genetically engineered crops worldwide 
in 2004.  Large players also populate the processing and retailing portions of the 
chain.  Names like Nestle and Kraft in food processing and Wal-Mart and 
Carrefour in food retailing are substantial participants.    
Another important group of participants are the State Trading Enterprises 
(STE).  STEs are government or private enterprises that have been granted 
privileges by their governments, such as exclusive authority for import/export of 
grain and government support for operating costs.  State trading is more prevalent 
in agriculture than in other industries, because many countries use state trading 
enterprises (STEs) as a means to achieve policy objectives such as domestic price 
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support, efficiencies in agricultural marketing, and affordable food supplies for 
low-income populations.  STEs account for significant shares of world trade in 
grains, dairy products, and sugar (Ackerman and Dixit 1999).  STEs can be very 
large and account for significant shares of world trade in grains.  These entities 
are not generally required to publish information about their activities, making 
data hard to get.  According to Ackerman and Dixit, in 1999 the Canadian and 
Australian Wheat Boards were accountable together for about 24% and 38% of 
world exports of wheat and barley, respectively (Ackerman and Dixit 1999).  The 
Canadian Wheat Board, which is responsible for pooling and exporting grain from 
the western provinces of Canada, describes itself as the largest seller of wheat and 
barley in the world, with operations in 70 countries. 
  
Figure 7.  Participant structure of grain market action arena. 
The grain market action arena (Figure 7), includes the grain exchanges.  
There are many exchanges around the world that trade futures contracts for grain, 
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especially corn (maize), wheat, and soybeans.  In the United States, the Chicago 
Board of Trade is the oldest exchange and the largest in the world for the trade of 
corn.  Other large US exchanges include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, and the Kansas City Board of Trade. 
2.2.4 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The fourth action arena is the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (Figure 8).  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is a treaty that arose from a United Nations Conference held 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 – The Earth Summit.  The treaty is international and has 
as its primary goal stabilization of green house gas emission at a level that would 
not interfere with the climate system.   
The treaty, which gained the 50 national approvals necessary to enter into 
force in 1994, contained no binding targets or enforcement provisions.  Rather, it 
urged countries and especially developed countries to take appropriate voluntary 
actions to stabilize emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000.  
It also provided for updates in the form of protocols.  To date, the only protocol to 
be agreed to is the Kyoto Protocol, which does set out targets for Annex I 
countries, but again without enforcement provisions.  Signatory countries were 
divided into three groups: 
1) Annex I countries (Table 3), which are industrialized countries and 
which are expected to take action to reduce their emissions below 
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1990 levels.  This group includes the current 40 Annex I countries plus 
the European Union. 
2) Annex II countries, which are mainly the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries,  which are expected 
to assist developing countries in reducing their emissions in addition to 
lowering their own.   
3) Developing Countries, which have no specific obligations under the 
convention.  
 
Table 3.  List of Annex I countries (UNFCCC 2010b). 
Australia Austria Belarus Belgium 
Bulgaria Canada Croatia Czech Republic 
Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Germany Greece Hungary Iceland 
Ireland Italy Japan Latvia 
Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Monaco 
Netherlands New Zealand Norway  Poland 
Portugal Romania Russian Federation Slovakia 
Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
 
The United States ratified the UNFCCC treaty and joined the convention 
under President George H. Bush in 1992.  However, the United States under 
George W. Bush did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and the country remains 
outside of that agreement. 
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The UNFCCC is governed by the treaty and protocols agreed under it and 
are supported by a secretariat of the same name.  The treaty provides for a number 
of bodies for decision making, advice, and implementation (Table 4).  The role of 
the secretariat is to administer the activities created or implied by the treaty and 
protocols.  An especially important function is to organize Conferences of the 
Parties (COP) to the Convention, Conferences of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP), and assist the Parties (members of the UNFCCC – COP and CMP) in 
negotiations and implementation of agreements.  The secretariat also compiles 
data, monitors commitments, and administers credits under the emission trading 
schemes.  In discharging some of these responsibilities, the Secretariat is assisted 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
 
Table 4.  Bodies of the framework convention (UNFCCC 2010a). 
Name Function 
Conference of the Parties Prime authority of the convention 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice 
Counsels the COP 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation Reviews how convention is applied 
Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) 
Helps developing countries prepare national 
reports 
Least Developed Country Expert Group Advises on climate adaptation 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer Facilitates sharing of technology  
 
COP is the ultimate decision-making body of the Convention, which 
meets every year to review the implementation of the Convention.  Successive 
decisions taken by the COP make up a detailed set of rules for practical and 
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effective implementation of the Convention.  Only parties to the convention can 
participate in decision making.  Governments nominate their respective 
representatives to participate and negotiate at the sessions of the Convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Representatives typically include ministers, negotiators, and 
those who the governments consider necessary to achieve their goals during the 
sessions.  
Though not a part of the UNFCCC, the IPCC is an important entity in the 
overall climate issue because of the very important role it plays in compiling and 
interpreting scientific information.  The IPCC does not carry out research, nor 
does it monitor climate.  Rather, the IPCC is an intergovernmental scientific body 
tasked to evaluate the risk of climate change caused by human activity.  The panel 
was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), two organizations under the 
United Nations.   
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Exogenous Variables:
IPCC reports; social; geopolitical and macroeconomic environment
assigned to
Participants:
Government nominees
Discipline experts
Positions:
COP/CMP delegate
UNFCCC bodies
UNFCCC Secretariat
assigned to
Actions:
Protocols
Assessments
Advice
Net Costs 
And Benefits
Assigned to
Potential 
Outcomes
Linked to
Control
over
Information
about
 
Figure 8.  The internal structure of UNFCCC action situation. 
 
Reports of the IPCC are approved by a complex process of drafting, 
review, debate, and consensus building as shown in Figure 9.  While generally 
seen as authoritative, they also are often controversial both with respect to the 
science and the political overtones of their reports (Dahan-Dalmedico 2008).  The 
IPCC has published four comprehensive assessment reports reviewing the latest 
climate science, as well as a number of reports on special topics.  Because they 
are authoritative they form a critical part of the biophysical/material background 
to the UNFCCC action arena. 
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Figure 9.  IPCC report process (Saundry 2008). 
 
The IPCC is itself governed by a formal governance system.  Membership 
in the IPCC is only open to member states of the WMO and UNEP.  The IPCC 
Panel, the governing body, is composed of representatives appointed by 
governments.  However, participation of delegates who have appropriate expertise 
but who may not have been appointed by a government is encouraged.  In this 
case, additional experts may attend upon invitation of the Chairman and approval 
of the Panel.  In this way international, intergovernmental, or non-governmental 
organizations may participate in panel discussions, task forces and working 
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groups (IPCC 1998).  Plenary sessions of the IPCC and IPCC working groups are 
held at the level of government representatives.  Nongovernmental and 
intergovernmental organizations may be allowed to attend as observers subject to 
approval by the Panel (IPCC 2006)   
2.2.5 World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
The fifth and final action arena is the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Figure 10), and its predecessor organization the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT).  By their own description, the leadership of the WTO see 
themselves in a number of different ways.  "It‟s an organization for liberalizing 
trade.  It‟s a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements.  It‟s a place for 
them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules" (WTO 2007).  
The WTO grew out of the GATT which was formed in 1947 and lasted until 
1994, when it was replaced in 1995.      
The World Trade Organization (WTO) does not currently have a trade 
regime specific to biofuels, as it does with agriculture products for example.  
International trade in biofuels is governed therefore, under the rules of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Selivanova 2007), which covers trade 
in all goods.  Because it creates an international framework for trade in goods and 
services the WTO is important to biofuels and especially bioethanol.  Bioethanol 
can be affected directly through rules governing its international trade but also 
indirectly through rules applying to agriculture and energy products.   
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The WTO is composed of 153 member countries and it is run by its 
member governments.  All major decisions are made by the membership as a 
whole and decisions are most often made through consensus.  The WTO has four 
layers of authority.  The highest level of authority is the Ministerial conference, 
who may make decisions on all matters of any multilateral trade agreement.  They 
meet at least once every two years.  
Exogenous Variables:
Markets International/National/Local, 16 Multilateral Agreements, Two Plurilateral Agreements
assigned to
Participants:
153 Member Countries
Positions:
•Council for Trade in Goods
•Council for Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights
•Council for Trade in Services
•Trade Negotiations Committee
•Committees on Agriculture
•Working Party on State Trading Enterprises
assigned to
Actions:
•Administering WTO Trade Agreements
•Forum for Trade Negotiations
•Handling Trade Disputes
•Monitoring National Trade Policies
Technical Assistance & Training for 
•Developing Countries
•Cooperation with International Organizations
Net Costs 
And Benefits
Assigned to
Potential 
Outcomes
Linked to
Control
over
Information
about
 Figure 10.  The internal structure of WTO action situation. 
 
The second tier of authority is composed of the General Council, who 
reports to the Ministerial conference, and acts on their behalf on all WTO affairs.  
While technically being one General Council, this group is handled under three 
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differing guises, the general council, the dispute settlement body, and the trade 
policy review body.  The groups are all of the same entity but simply meet under 
different terms of reference.  The third level of authority is composed of three 
further councils who report to the general council.  Each council is assigned to a 
different broad area of trade.  These three councils are the council for trade in 
goods, the council for trade in services, and the council for trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights.  Six other bodies also report to the General 
Council, and focus on issues regarding trade and development, regional trading 
arrangements, the environment, and administrative issues.  Due to their smaller 
scope of coverage they are referred to as “committees”. 
The fourth and final tier is composed of subsidiary bodies, which each of 
the higher level councils have.  This group of higher level councils includes the 
Goods Council, the Services council, and the Dispute Settlement body (at the 
general council level).  The Council for Trade in Goods‟ committees include 
subjects like agriculture, market access, trading, subsidies, and so on.  The 
Council for trade in Services fourth tier bodies include financial services, 
domestic regulations, GATS Rules and specific commitments.  The Dispute 
Settlement Body has two subsidiaries, the dispute settlement panels and the 
Appellate Body.  
Negotiations of the WTO take place in rounds.  Table 5 shows the rounds 
and principle themes of negotiations since the beginning of GATT.  Negotiations 
today take place under what is known as the Doha round.  This is the first round 
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of new negotiations under the WTO.  It began in 2001 and was expected to be 
concluded in January of 2005.  That deadline was not met and negotiations 
continue under the Doha round.  
Energy has mostly not been addressed by international agreements, and 
until recently, there was a common perception that GATT rules did not apply to 
trade in energy.  This perception arose mainly because in the 1980s most energy 
producing countries were not parties of the GATT agreement.  This is 
understandable, especially in the case of countries rich in energy resources, since 
their energy exports did not encounter market access barriers.  On the other hand, 
becoming a contracting party to the GATT would oblige them to undertake 
binding commitments and to open domestic markets.  
Table 5.  Negotiating rounds under GATT and WTO (WTO 2007, Wikipedia 2010b). 
Year Place/name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26 
1960-1961 
Geneva, Dillion 
Round 
Tariffs 26 
1964-1967 
Geneva, Kennedy 
Round 
Tariffs and anti-dumping 
measures 
62 
1973-1979 
Geneva, Tokyo 
Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures 
“framework” agreements 
102 
1986-1994 
Geneva, Uraguay 
Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
rules, services, intellectual 
property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, creation 
of WTO, etc 
123 
2001 - Present Doha Round of WTO 
19 subjects including 
agriculture 
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As energy rich countries diversified their economies they saw more 
incentives to participate in trade agreements.  While their energy exports did not 
have obstacles to reaching the export markets, their downstream products often 
did.  Fertilizers, ammonia for example, often needed to compete in the export 
markets with the subsidized domestic production of importing countries.  Market 
access problems became an increasing concern for energy-rich countries.   
With accession of some major world energy and petroleum producers to 
the GATT and the WTO, the issues of energy trade became increasingly apparent.  
The US and the European Community raised energy during the Tokyo and 
Uruguay Rounds of multilateral negotiations.  Little progress was made as the 
proposals met with opposition from energy-rich countries. 
It is now commonly accepted that existing WTO rules do apply to energy 
products.  The problem is, however, that these rules are not well designed to 
address the energy sector (Selivanova 2007).  Energy and especially energy 
services are likely to be more prominent as the Doha round continues, but still a 
minor theme and substantial adjustments are not likely soon. 
In contrast an important theme of the Doha round and one where much 
effort has been expended to extend trade rules is agriculture.  Agriculture was 
essentially exempted from early rounds under GATT as it was given special status 
in the areas of import quotas and export subsidies, with only mild caveats.  
However, by the time of the Uruguay round in 1986, many countries believed 
agriculture needed to be addressed.  Agreement was reached in 1994 on the 
38 
 
Uruguay Round, and it included a substantial trade liberalization agreement for 
agriculture.  Among the goals for the Doha round are to improve market access 
for agricultural products, reduce domestic support of agriculture in the form of 
price-distorting subsidies and quotas, and eliminate over time export subsidies on 
agricultural products. 
Progress on any of these goals will have direct and immediate impact on 
US agriculture policy, as at a minimum, the 2008 Farm Bill would not comply 
with the intent of the Doha Round (Murphy and Suppan 2008) .   
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CHAPTER 3 
EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST GENERATION BIOFUELS  
3.1 Introduction 
 
Turning now to my first core question:  Why did first generation biofuels 
enjoy such extensive public and political support as late as 2007, and now are met 
with increasing skepticism?  Policy towards biofuels in the US, and in other parts 
of the world, has been evolving continuously since the 1970‟s, largely driven by 
economic factors, especially supply and demand of oil products and grains, as 
well as the social and political consequences of decisions associated with the five 
action arenas described above.  Consequently, the IAD makes an effective 
framework for understanding factors effecting policy decisions.  I will focus on 
four time periods that are defined by important acts passed by the US Government 
(Table 6).  These acts both embodied the sense of public discourse around the 
three other action arenas and set new policy direction.  The four time periods I 
will assess with the IAD framework are:  
1) Pre-1978 which ends with the passage of the Energy Act of 1978, 
2) 1978 to 1989 which ends with the passage of the clean air act 
amendments of 1990,  
3) 1990 to 2004 which ends with the passage of the energy act of 2005  
4) 2005 to the present  
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For each time period I will provide context by looking at the exogenous 
variables for each relevant action arena, then how outcomes in these arenas 
interacted to shape policy debate and ultimately acts of Congress. 
 
Table 6.  Periods for analysis of policy development.  
Time Period Defining Event 
Pre 1978 National Energy Act of 1978 
1978 – 1989 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
1990 – 2004 Energy Policy Act of 2005 
2005 – Present Continuing. Not Yet Identified 
 
The role of the action arenas and the dynamic interplay among them has 
varied considerably over time.  In fact, the UNFCCC wasn‟t even created until 
1992, and did not enter into force until 1994.  Additionally, agriculture policy 
didn‟t become a serious part of the WTO negotiations until the Doha round which 
began in 2001.  In order to understand the evolution of biofuel policy, it is helpful 
to break the analysis into time periods. There is an element of arbitrariness about 
choosing time periods.  In selecting the time periods, I have been guided by 
defining events that have substantially changed the policy environment.  Not 
surprisingly these events have been the result of a major legislative action by the 
US Federal Government.    
The first time period is pre 1978.  In 1978, the US Federal Government 
passed The National Energy Act of 1978.  This was a watershed piece of 
legislation for biofuels because it was the first time the US provided significant 
subsidies for the production of bioethanol. The second time period I selected is 
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1978 to 1989.  This period ends with the passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.  Until the amendments to the Clean Air Act were passed, 
the principle policy driver for corn ethanol was the tax subsidy arising from The 
National Energy Act of 1978.  With the passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 entirely new markets began to open up for bioethanol.  
These new markets created a richer dynamic in the market place and in policy 
arenas. The third time period is 1990 -2004.  This period ends with the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005.  This act is important because this was the first time the US 
Federal Government mandated the use of bioethanol in reformulated gasoline, and 
set targets for biofuels in the transportation sector (table 11) .  The final time 
period is 2005 – present.  This period continues into the immediate future.  
3.2 Pre -1978 
3.2.1 Exogenous Variables 
Government policy is of particular importance as agriculture is central to 
issues of social stability in all countries. Hayami and Godo (2004) have developed 
a compact framework for assessing agricultural goals that drive government 
policy.  They identify three agricultural problems: 
1) For developing countries, avoiding food shortages 
2) For middle income countries, lagging farm income 
3) For developed countries, farm income protection  
Irrespective of the problem, the policy response tends to be substantially 
the same - government intervention to move prices of agricultural products, or to 
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moderate the impact of global prices to suit the country‟s social needs.  Quoting 
Hayami and Godo (2004) “political distortions in both developed and developing 
countries are the major determinant of food trade.  In high-income countries, 
despite chronic oversupply of food, domestic farm production continued to be 
subsidized heavily, resulting in substantial burdens on consumers and taxpayers.  
On the other hand, in low-income countries, governments often employ 
agriculture-exploitation policies, further aggravating their food shortage.“  
The scale of these impacts is large.  At the high end, Anderson et al. 
(2006) estimate that, by 2015, full liberalization of trade in agriculture  will result 
in $173 billion of annual real income gain worldwide against a 2001 baseline 
(Anderson et al. 2006), with the benefits split roughly one third to developing 
countries and two thirds to developed countries.  Other estimates are lower but 
still substantial (Table 7). 
Yet trade liberalization in agriculture products has met with serious 
difficulty in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
negotiations.  Two frequently cited obstacles are the need for the EU to be 
persuaded to make bigger tariff cuts in agriculture, and the US needs to accept 
bigger cuts in domestic agriculture subsidies (Kernohan 2006).    
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Table 7. Results obtained in OECD & other studies of trade liberalization (Kernohan 2006). 
Study Liberalization scenario 
 
Global welfare gains ($billion) 
Agriculture       Other          Total 
Ash & 
Tangermann 
(2006) 
50% cut in domestic 
agricultural support 50% 
cut in applied tariffs – 
all sectors, all regions 
26 18 44 
Anderson et al. 
(2005) 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
trade protection in all 
sectors 
173 105 278 
Beghin et al. 
(2002) 
Elimination of 
agricultural support and 
protection in high-
income OECD countries 
108 n/a n/a 
François et al. 
(2003) 
Elimination of tariffs, all 
sectors, all regions 
109 107 367* 
Hertel & Keeney 
(2005) 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
tariffs – all sectors, all 
regions 
56 28 84 
OECD (2003) Elimination of trade 
protection, all sectors 
34 63 174** 
Tobarick (2005) Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
trade protection 
20 n/a n/a 
UNCTAD 
(2003) 
50% cut in applied 
agricultural support and 
tariffs, all sectors 
31 n/a n/a 
USDA (2001) Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
tariffs, all sectors 
56 n/a n/a 
World Bank 
(2003) 
Near 100% reduction in 
domestic agricultural 
support and applied 
tariffs 
193 98 291 
*  Includes gains from services liberalization.  ** Includes gains from trade facilitation. 
 
The problem facing both the EU and US can be understood within the 
Hayami and Godo (2004) model.  For the US, the problem originated in the early 
1920‟s.  According to Bowers et al. (1984), “The relative decline in the farmers' 
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position had begun in the summer of 1920 when the United States began the 
transition from a debtor to a creditor Nation after World War I, resulting in a 
continued loss in the volume and price of exports.  Thus, for a decade farmers 
were caught in a serious squeeze between the prices they received and the prices 
they had to pay before the situation became critical and a major element of the 
Depression.”  Until then, and especially in the period just after the turn of the 
century, farm income was relatively stable and farmers held acceptable 
purchasing power in relative terms.  By the early 1930‟s their income relative to 
city workers was seriously eroding, leading to Agriculture Adjustment acts in 
1933 (73rd Congress 1933) and 1938 (75th Congress 1938) and the introduction 
of the concept of parity.  Parity seeks an equality of exchange relationship 
between agriculture and industry or between persons living on farms and persons 
not on farms. 
In the Hayami Godo (2004) model, the US was now a category 3 country.  
Since that time, politicians particularly from rural areas have felt a powerful need 
to protect rural income.  Similar events and pressures have unfolded in Europe as 
much of the region became category 3 as well.  The challenge to policy makers in 
the US is made more difficult due to the market structure for agriculture products.    
As pointed out by Murphy (Murphy 2008), markets are riddled with power 
imbalances, making the assumption of perfect competition untenable.  Those 
assumptions include perfect information flows, no barriers to new entrants in the 
market, and the capacity to adjust supply smoothly and rapidly with changes in 
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demand.  Agricultural commodity markets are particularly prone to failure.  
Agricultural market realities include a range of imperfections: 
 The „hour-glass‟ shape of the market: many farmers sell to a handful 
of processors or grain traders, who then add value to the commodities 
to make food which is sold to many consumers. 
 Slow supply and demand responses to changes in the market:  while 
new ways to use food are constantly emerging, people do not double 
their meat intake if the price of beef drops by 50%.  Should a drought 
wipe out an important part of global production, it would take 6-12 
months or more to increase supply. 
 Land does not easily come in and out of production:  land ownership 
in most countries is decentralized and individual farmers cannot afford 
to keep land idle.  Typically, a farmer‟s response to either high or low 
prices is to increase production.  This makes downward price spirals 
related to overproduction hard to halt.  
 Land is not mobile.  The textile industry can shift production from the 
US or Italy, to China or Bangladesh, because capital can move to buy 
and build the necessary factories, and labor is available everywhere.  
But no amount of trade liberalization can move arable land from the 
US or Brazil to Bangladesh. 
Low prices may marginally reduce production, but, on the whole, 
agricultural markets do not self-adjust easily.  The first land to go out of 
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production is the marginal land with the lowest per acre yields.  Farmers generally 
cannot afford to miss a year‟s crop or to absorb the cost of maintaining idle land 
(and storing equipment that depreciates annually).  Over the past century, 
developed countries have experienced a simultaneous dramatic reduction in the 
number of people living directly from agriculture, but increased overall yields, 
with the amount of land in production staying relatively unchanged.  Individual 
farmers cannot affect overall supply through their production choices because 
they do not grow enough to affect total supply in the market, even locally, let 
alone at the global level.  Economic logic thus dictates that farmers maximize 
their production whether prices are high or low.  High prices bring new producers 
(and, especially, new land) into production, but low prices are slow to push 
existing producers out, or to reduce production.  The opportunity costs of exiting 
are high because there is no quick way back in and because most agriculture takes 
years to show a return.  
The market structural problems are exacerbated by technological advances 
in agriculture that have enabled agricultural productivity to increase relative to 
non-farm goods and services in the US.  Technological advances in 
bioengineering have contributed to a significant, and still lasting, productivity 
growth in agriculture and the trend is likely to continue.  Milijkovic et al. (2008), 
assessed a range of reasons for the decline of relative farm income and found that 
increased productivity from technological improvement the most prominent 
factor.  Interestingly, he also observed that by increasing direct payments to the 
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farmers, government encouraged continuous overproduction, and overproduction 
in the sector, leads to lower market prices and returns.  
In the period to 1978, US Agriculture policy was characterized by 
increasingly sophisticated measures to sustain farm income while avoiding 
catastrophic budgetary impacts.  However, the 1970's were a benign period as the 
position of agriculture had changed profoundly from where it had been a decade 
before.  World crop shortages and a falling dollar sharply escalated the trend 
toward greater export demand for American crops.  Following the Soviet grain 
sale of 1972, grain exports nearly doubled between 1972 and 1973.  Government 
grain stocks, which had depressed grain markets, were essentially eliminated.  
Even higher output by grain farmers was quickly absorbed by the market.  It 
appeared that demand had fully caught up with supply, and that demand would 
continue strong for the near term.   
In fact, the agricultural markets had become so favorable that policy 
emphasized expanded production to respond to growing worldwide demand and 
to hold down price increases.  In March 1981, Secretary Block proposed a farm 
bill to reduce the role and expense of Government in agriculture and rely more on 
export promotion.  Shortly after Congress received this proposal, each house 
passed a budget resolution calling for major cuts in spending, including 
agricultural programs.  
There were clouds on the horizon, however.  High farm prices increased 
demand for farmland that drove land values up.  Greater dependence on export 
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markets made commodities more vulnerable to price swings from economic or 
political events in other parts of the world.  Meanwhile, continued food price 
inflation brought consumer demands that support for agriculture be reduced 
(Bowers et al. 1984). 
In contrast to the relatively stable grain markets, at least as viewed from a 
US perspective, the oil markets were more concerning.  Oil had a history of use as 
an instrument of foreign policy prior to World War II, and was even more so 
during and following the war.  The US cut off supplies of oil to Japan in 1941 to 
encourage them to withdraw from China, and Arab states embargoed the US, the 
UK, and Germany following the 1967 war in Palestine (Crane et al. 2009).  
Though in neither case did the policy achieve the desired ends, the attempt served 
as a warning of things to come.  In 1973, the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted a boycott against the US, Netherlands, and 
Portugal for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur war.  This time, in addition to 
the boycott, they also cut production which had the effect of driving oil prices 
from $3/barrel in 1972 to over $11 by early 1974.  This time, the effort did have 
an effect.  The US, lead by Henry Kissinger, undertook a program of shuttle 
diplomacy with Arab States that resulted in an end to the boycott and partial 
withdrawal of Israel from newly occupied territory (Crane et al. 2009).  While in 
retrospect, a case can be made that embargoes have never been a threat to US 
energy security (Stern 2006), this was not the prevailing view in the 1970s.  The 
US perceived itself as vulnerable to the "oil weapon". 
49 
 
As can be seen in Figure 11, by 1970 oil production in the US had peaked 
and was in decline.  Since consumption continued to rise imports were also rising 
sharply.   
 
Figure 11.  US crude oil overview 1949 - 2008 (EIA 2009b). 
 
The combination of instability in the Middle East, higher oil imports, and 
higher oil and gasoline prices lead to a series of measures passed by Congress and 
signed by President Nixon.  In 1973, Project Independence was announced.  The 
stated goal of Project Independence was to achieve energy self-sufficiency for the 
United States by 1980 through a national commitment to energy conservation and 
development of alternative sources of energy.  Nixon declared that American 
science, technology, and industry could free America from dependence on 
imported oil.  Some of the important initiatives to emerge from Project 
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Independence included lowering highway speeds to 55 mph, converting oil power 
plants to coal, completion of the Trans-Alaskan pipeline, and diverting federal 
funds from highway construction to mass transit.  The energy crisis led to greater 
interest in renewable energy especially solar power and wind power.  It also led to 
greater pressure to exploit North American oil sources, and increased the US 
dependence on coal and nuclear power.  This included increased interest in mass 
transit (Wikipedia 2010a). 
During this period the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve was 
created, and in 1977, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 
were enacted by Congress.  In 1976, the U.S. Congress created the Weatherization 
Assistance Program to help low-income homeowners and renters deal with rising 
heating costs by reducing their demand through advanced insulation.  The 
cabinet-level Department of Energy was created, followed by passage of the 
National Energy Act of 1978.    
The UNFCCC was not created until 1992.  So as an action arena, it was 
not relevant during this time period.  But environmental concerns were.  Earth day 
was established in 1970 and by 1978 was a global annual event.  The possibility 
of global warming or climate change was suggested already in 1906 in a paper by 
the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius (Arrhenius 1906).  By the late 1970s 
climate models of increasing sophistication were under development (see for 
example Schneider 1975 or Ramanathan and Coakley 1978 for reviews) which 
showed the potential for significant warming as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
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increased.  Nevertheless, there was no particular action arena for climate, and 
climate was not yet central to any other arena.   
The WTO was in full action as GATT, but as mentioned earlier agriculture 
was substantially excluded for early rounds, as was energy.  Thus, we find in 
1978 that the formal action arena the US government and two informal arenas - 
the grain market and the oil market - were the primary drivers relevant to 
bioethanol in the US. 
3.2.2 Support for Biofuels 
In 1978, commercial production of bioethanol in the US was virtually non-
existent.  As grain markets were generally favorable, there was little drive from 
the agriculture sector for alternative uses of grain, and, though energy prices were 
high and security concerns heightened, the cost of bioethanol was not competitive 
with oil based products and thus bioethanol plants did not attract investment.    
As articulated by Gavett et al (1986) bioethanol did have some attractions: 
 Available technology.  Industrial and beverage ethanol industries had 
perfected the production process.  In addition, corn wet-milling 
facilities can produce ethanol or high-fructose corn syrup, a sugar 
substitute. 
 Short lead time.  A fuel ethanol production facility can start up 11 to 
26 months after construction begins, thereby presenting a relatively 
swift response to the threat of loss of supply of liquid fuels.  Other 
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alternate fuels, such as shale oil and gasoline from coal, require far 
longer periods before economic quantities can be produced. 
By 1977, events began to change in favor of bioethanol.  Corn prices 
declined for the third year in a row and were now 30% lower than three years 
earlier (see Figure 12) and events in Iran were again causing concern about 
energy security.  Bioethanol as a policy response appeared in the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1977, which authorized loan guarantees of up to $15 million 
each for four ethanol from biomass pilot plants.  Two ethanol plants were 
considered for financing under this program but neither was funded (Gavett et al. 
1986). 
 
Figure 12.  Annual average corn farm price in US (Farmdoc University of Illinois 2010c). 
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In the same year, President Carter took office pledging to address US 
energy security.  In April, the President introduced an aggressive energy program 
designed to curb energy consumption and stimulate alternatives to foreign oil.  In 
October, the much less ambitious National Energy Act of 1978 was passed, which 
was actually a package of several acts including the Energy Tax Act of 1978.  
Within the Energy Tax Act of 1978 was a provision that allowed ethanol blends 
of at least 10% by volume a $0.40 per gallon exemption from the federal motor 
fuels tax (McDonald 1979).  This was the first time that ethanol was subsidized 
when produced from agricultural products.  While the act was controversial, the 
ethanol subsidy was not and played no apparent role in its passage.  In fact, in a 
multivariable analysis carried out by Uri (1980), the farm interest groups did not 
favor the Energy Act package largely because it raised energy prices. 
The three action arenas present during this period are the US Federal 
government, the oil market, and the grain market.  The grain market played out in 
the background through this period acting as a back drop for determining levels of 
rural income.  In contrast, volatility and potential instability in the oil markets 
brought considerable pressure on the US Federal Government to seek alternatives 
to its dependence on foreign oil.  The decades long concern for rural development 
and farm income caused the US Federal government to explore numerous policy 
options. The National Energy act of 1978 was one of those important policy 
options that created a new mechanism for supporting agriculture.  This approach 
was particularly attractive since it was perceived over time to be able to address 
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the foreign oil dependency problem, while simultaneously, through the potential 
for longer term price support, aided the grain markets.  While the US Federal 
Government was clearly sensitive to actions in the grain and oil markets, and vice 
versa, there was little interaction between grain and oil markets.  Oil pricing did, 
to an extent, impact grain production costs, but this factor was not a dominate 
one.  Grain markets through biofuels had no impact on the oil markets.  Biofuel 
volumes were simply too small to matter. 
3.3 From 1978 TO 1989 
This period ends with the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990.  During this time period, bioethanol from grain rises substantially, but 
remains a minor feature in the fuel market of the United States.  It is more 
prominent as a policy option to support agricultural interests. 
3.3.1 Exogenous Variables 
The period begins well for corn markets and US producers.  Production 
was generally trending upward (Figure 13), and exports (Figure 14) were strong 
as were prices (table 8).  However, the situation rapidly deteriorated.  Exports 
began a steep decline in 1980, falling by nearly 50% by 1985.  With US 
production at an all time high, corn prices plummeted, falling from $3.21 in 1983 
to $1.50 in 1986.  Total net income from farming dropped to its lowest levels 
since 1933.  Farm income per farm was lower than at any time since the mid-
1960s.  Loan delinquencies grew, and farmland values leveled off after tripling 
over the course of a decade.  The 1981 Farm bill had been intended to save 
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Government funds, but in 1982 the weak farm economy brought a sharp increase 
in payments to farmers, back to the levels of the 1960s (Bowers et al. 1984). 
Transfer payments rose rapidly and contributed significantly to the rising 
federal budget deficit.  In 1985, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimated that elimination of deficiency payments would save taxpayers $28.9 
billion over five years (Johnson and Libecap 2001).  Non-farm sectors of the 
economy were increasingly showing concern about the very large transfer 
payments to the agriculture sector, and the resulting pressure on the federal 
budget. 
  
 
 
Figure 13.  Annual US production of corn (Farmdoc University of Illinois 2010b). 
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Figure 14.  Annual US corn exports (Farmdoc University of Illinois 2010a). 
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Table 8.  Corn price, target price and deficiency payment for US agriculture support programs 
(Johnson and Libecap 2001). 
Year U.S. Corn 
Prices 
($/bu) 
Target 
Price 
($/bu) 
Deficiency 
Payments 
($millions) 
1975 2.54 1.38 0 
1976 2.15 1.57 0 
1977 2.02 2.00 0 
1978 2.25 2.10 88 
1979 2.48 2.20 0 
1980 3.12 2.35 0 
1981 2.47 2.40 0 
1982 2.55 2.70 291 
1983 3.21 2.86 0 
1984 2.63 3.03 1,653 
1985 2.23 3.03 2,480 
1986 1.50 3.03 6,195 
1987 1.94 3.03 5,910 
1988 2.54 2.93 2,163 
1989 2.36 2.84 3,504 
1990 2.28 2.75 3,014 
1991 2.37 2.75 2,080 
1992 2.07 2.75 3,625 
1993 2.50 2.75 1,502 
1994 2.26 2.75 3,199 
1995 3.24 2.75 0,096 
 
In the energy markets, oil prices rose early in the period largely due to 
events in Iran and Iraq in 1979 and 1980.  The Iranian revolution resulted in the 
loss of more than 2 million barrels per day of oil production between November, 
1978 and June, 1979.  Subsequently, as Iran was weakened by the revolution, it 
was invaded by Iraq in September, 1980.  By November the combined production 
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of both countries was only a million barrels per day and 6.5 million barrels per 
day less than a year before.  As a consequence, worldwide crude oil production 
was 10% lower than in 1979.  The combination of the Iranian revolution, and the 
Iraq-Iran War, caused crude oil prices to more than double, increasing from $14 
in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981(WTRG Economics 1999) .  
Surging prices caused several reactions among consumers:  better 
insulation in homes, more energy efficiency in industry, and automobiles with 
higher efficiency.  These factors, along with a global recession, had caused a 
reduction in demand for crude oil.  When combined with an increase in non-
OPEC production, supply and demand became unbalanced, and prices began to 
fall.  From 1982 to 1985, OPEC attempted to set production quotas low enough to 
stabilize prices.  These attempts met with failure as members of OPEC produced 
beyond their quotas.  
During most of this period Saudi Arabia acted to rebalance the market by 
cutting its production in an attempt to stem the free fall in prices.  In August of 
1985, the Saudis changed strategies and linked their oil price to the spot market 
for crude, and by early 1986, increased production from 2 million barrels per day 
to 5 million.  Crude oil prices plummeted below $10 per barrel by mid-1986.  
The rapid fall in itself was unsettling, as it created considerable stress 
within the oil industry especially in the United States.  So much so that in April of 
1986 then Vice-President George H. W. Bush traveled to Saudi Arabia to 
encourage the King to use the country's influence to stabilize oil prices.  
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According to Yergin (1991), on the eve of his trip, Bush said that he would "be 
selling very hard" to persuade the Saudis "of our own domestic interest and thus 
the interest of national security… I think it is essential that we talk about stability 
and that we not just have a continued free fall like a parachutist jumping out 
without a parachute."  Bush added, "I happen to believe, and always have, that a 
strong domestic U.S. industry is in the national security interests, vital interests of 
this country."  Following his meeting with the King, Yergin quotes Bush as 
saying, "There is some point at which the national security interest of the United 
States says, 'Hey, we must have a strong, viable domestic industry.'  I've felt that 
way all my political life and I'm not going to start changing that at this juncture.  I 
feel it, and I know the President of the United States feels it." 
The US concerns were taken seriously, and during a summer of intense 
activity, Saudi Arabia worked out a broad agreement with both OPEC and non-
OPEC members to agree to quotas or production limits in order to achieve a target 
price of $17 to $19 per barrel.  By the end of 1986 an agreement was reached, and 
though prices continued to be volatile, and below the $18 target price (Figure 15), 
the decline was stopped, and prices sufficiently stabilized ending the political 
pressure in the market over the next several years.   
In the mean time, ethanol as a motor fuel continued to grow very slowly 
(Figure 16), from about 2 thousand barrels in 1981 to 20 thousand in 1989.  Little 
of consequence happened in the early part of the period, but in 1986, the US 
Department of Agriculture released a cost/benefit analysis, produced by a team 
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lead by Earle Gavett a staff member of the USDA.  As cited earlier, this report 
was scathing in its assessment of bioethanol.  With pressure on transfer payments 
to farm interests already building, the report could not have come at a worse time.  
It immediately drew criticism from Congressional figures from districts highly 
dependent on corn.  Representative Stallings of Idaho declared the study seriously 
flawed, and Senator Dole of Kansas introduced an amendment to the Farm 
Disaster Assistance Act of 1987 that required that the Secretary of Agriculture 
establish a seven-member panel to conduct a study of the cost-effectiveness of 
ethanol production (Johnson and Libecap 2001).  The report of the panel did not 
actually establish the viability of bioethanol, but it did report optimistically about 
the potential for technology to reduce costs. 
Other reports followed, with the repeated emphasis on the environmental 
and rural development benefits of bioethanol.  Finally, a 1988 USDA report 
(LeBlanc and Reilly 1988) argued that with bioethanol production reaching 2.7 
billion gallons by 1995, corn prices would increase substantially, reducing 
deficiency payments to such an extent that there would be a net savings to the 
government.  This report concluded that ethanol could remain cost competitive as 
a blending agent as long as the existing fuel excise tax exemption remained in 
place.  In the absence of the exemption, ethanol would struggle largely because of 
the glut in world petroleum markets, as mentioned earlier.  The report did remark 
on the nonmarket benefits of ethanol in meeting environmental, energy security, 
and agricultural goals, but the benefits were limited as alternatives to ethanol were 
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available.  As a shadow of things to come, the report noted that "ethanol 
production is self-limiting in terms of its contribution to national energy supplies.  
Production levels of two or three times current levels, while still a small 
proportion of the total energy use, would begin to place strong upward pressure 
on corn and other grain prices ...".  In 1988 ethanol production was 20 thousand 
barrels, or less than one tenth of the production of 2008.  Finally, the authors 
suggested that ethanol as a blend stock could support some of the provisions of 
the Clean Air Act Amendments by reducing carbon monoxide emissions in 
automobiles, but that it would be best used in winter as the higher volatility of 
ethanol blended fuels increases ozone. 
Among the formal action arenas, bioethanol remained a peripheral issue, 
but much was happening that would later have a major impact on biofuels.  By the 
end of the 1970s, the scientific community was heavily engaged in the question of 
climate change.  Evidence was clear that the earth's climate had changed in the 
past and there was some evidence that it could happen quickly.  Though most of 
this work concerned global cooling and glaciations, in 1977, a study by the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences focused on global warming from CO2 emissions, 
warning of a future risk of rising seas and failures of agricultural and marine 
production (National Academy of Sciences 1977).   
Though largely unrelated to the issue about global climate, a separate line 
of research brought the concern for anthropomorphic environmental change on a 
large scale firmly into the public conscious.  In 1974, two scientists, Mario 
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Molina and Frank Rowland, noticed that certain gases produced by industry 
"CFCs" had long lifetimes in the atmosphere which enabled them to rise up to the 
stratosphere where ultraviolet rays would destroy them, and in the process create 
new species that destroyed ozone (Molina and Rowland 1974).  The high, thin 
layer of ozone blocks the Sun's ultraviolet rays, so removing this layer could 
cause an increase of skin cancers, and perhaps bring still worse dangers to people, 
plants, and animals.  CFCs were the propellants in aerosol sprays so every day 
millions of people were adding to the global harm as they used cans of deodorant 
or paint.  Science journalists alerted the public, and environmentalists jumped on 
the issue.   
In 1977, the U.S. Congress added restrictions on CFCs to the new Clean 
Air Act Amendments.  A decade later, 40 industrial nations signed the Montreal 
Protocol which froze consumption of CFC's at 1986 levels by 1990, and aimed to 
decrease consumption 50% by 2000 (Wikipedia 2010c).  In 1990 the London 
Agreement was signed, that brought total participants to 93 nations.  And yet 
again in 1992, 87 industrial nations met in Copenhagen and agreed to a total 
phase-out of CFCs by January 1, 1996, and lesser developed countries were given 
until 2010 for full phase-out (Wikipedia 2010c).   
Since the adoption of the Montreal Protoco, and subsequent treaties, 
emissions of CFCs have declined and atmospheric concentrations of the most 
significant compounds have also been declining.  These substances are being 
gradually removed from the atmosphere.  Nevertheless, complete recovery of the 
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Antarctic ozone layer will not occur until the year 2050 or later (Newman et al. 
2006).  The Montreal Protocol was the first international treaty regulating an air 
pollutant in history.  The CFC/ozone story stands as an example of the ability for 
the international community to address a global problem.    
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Annual average crude oil price (BP 2010). 
3.3.2 Support for Biofuels 
During this time period (1978-1989) bioethanol was substantially 
irrelevant to all the action arena‟s, with the exception of the U.S Government, 
where support coming from representatives of agriculture states remained strong.  
The rapid congressional reaction to the Gavett et al. (1986) study underscores the 
depth of that support.  With support from Congress, bioethanol production 
increased from about 2 thousand barrels at the beginning of the period to about 20 
thousand by the end of 1989, with over 50 ethanol production related facilities 
operating.  Nevertheless, the industry continued to depend on Federal and State 
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subsidies.  And though a substantial increase, 20 thousand barrels remained less 
than 1% of all petroleum products used in transportation.   
The apparent smooth growth at the industry level also masked 
considerable turmoil for individual companies and plants.  The industry was 
unable to achieve consistent profitability because of changing economic 
conditions, especially the swings in corn and oil prices, and technological 
problems.  Many plants were forced to default on loans, or were forced into 
bankruptcy, including most of the small plants that received Federal loan 
guarantees.  Ethanol‟s use as an additive to gasoline to boost the oxygen content, 
became established during the period.  Environmental benefits of oxygenated 
fuels, such as an ethanol/gasoline blend, led several states to develop oxygenated 
fuel programs.  The first mandated program was instituted in the Denver, CO, 
metropolitan area and surrounding counties.  The program led to an 8 to 11% 
reduction in ambient carbon monoxide levels (Stedman 1989).  This and similar 
programs formed a component of regional air quality plans designed to bring 
ambient carbon monoxide levels below the standards established by the Clean Air 
Act Amendments.  The use of bioethanol to meet the requirements of the Clean 
Air Act Amendments becomes a more important theme later. 
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Figure 16.  Fuel Ethanol Overview, 1981-2008.  Annual U.S. production of fuel ethanol. Data does 
not include ethanol for purposes other than fuel (EIA 2008). 
 
Again during this time period, the three important action arenas were the 
oil market, grain market, and Federal Government.  The dynamic of the Pre 1978 
time period continued into this time period, specifically instability and volatility 
in the oil markets, and substantial pressure on rural incomes, due to depressed 
prices in the grain markets. While the impact of corn ethanol on the grain and oil 
markets was minimal, the reverse was not the case.  The volatility of these 
markets again made corn ethanol an attractive policy option even though analysis 
by the USDA showed little near or long term potential. 
3.4 From 1990 TO 2004 
This period ends with the Energy Act of 2005.  During the period 
production of bioethanol rises from 20 thousand to 81 thousand barrels per year. 
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3.4.1 Exogenous Variables 
Agricultural markets in 1990 were improved from the very difficult period 
in the late 1980s, but still remained generally unfavorable and volatile.  As the 
period began, corn production (Figure 13), remained high, while exports fell 
(Figure 14).  Actual prices fell well short of target prices (Table 8) resulting in a 
deficiency payment of over $3billion.  In 1990, Congress passed The Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (USDA 1990), as well as the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 .  Both acts built on the market-
oriented foundation laid by the Food Security Act of 1985 (U.S. Congress 1985).  
These initiatives reinforced measures already under way to promote freer trade, 
reduce the deficit, and to move U.S. and world agriculture toward greater market 
orientation.  
Pressure to cut the Federal budget deficit also played an important role.  
The main goals of 1990 farm legislation, food, agriculture, conservation, and 
trade act, were to further market orientation, reduce government spending on 
agricultural programs, help maintain farm income through expanding exports, and 
protect the environment.  To lower budget expenditures and increase market 
orientation, the 1990 legislation reduced payment acreage and introduced planting 
flexibility.  Producers could respond to market signals in their planting decisions 
because they could plant alternative crops on acres that were not eligible to 
receive income support payments (U.S. Congress 1990).   
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These efforts did not stem budget deficient problems, however, as 
deficiency payments remained high (Table 8).  In 1996, following a “better” 
agriculture market year in 1995, Congress passed a new farm bill called the 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.  The act made two 
major changes.  First, it ended supply controls by eliminating provisions that 
made farm aid contingent on keeping land out of production.  Second, it set up a 
seven-year schedule of fixed and declining direct farm payments completely de-
linked from market prices.  This change was intended to return agriculture in the 
United States to full market exposure over the seven year period (USDA 1996).   
To further promote market mechanisms, official US government policy 
actively promoted liberalized international trade measures to open new markets 
for US products, including at the Uruguay Round of the WTO.  This round of 
trade liberalization talks were completed in 1994, with new rules applicable to 
agriculture.  Specifically, rules were agreed in three broad categories (WTO 
2007).   
The first category was market access. Barriers to trade such as quotas, 
variable levies, and voluntary export restraints to agri-food imports were replaced 
by a tariff-only system, and a country could not increase tariffs unilaterally.  
Tariffs were also reduced.  Developed countries were required to reduce their 
tariffs by an average of 36% over six years, with a minimum cut in any one tariff 
line of 15% (WTO 2007).  
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The second category of new rules was for subsidies.  Subsidies to farmers 
were classified according to their impact on production.  Subsidies with minimal 
linkage to the quantities produced, the inputs used, or prices paid, were not 
affected, but most other subsidies were capped.  Developed countries had to 
reduce agricultural subsidies by 20% over six years . (WTO 2007).  
The final category was export subsidies.  The agreement did not ban 
export subsidies, but imposed severe restrictions on the quantities subsidized and 
the amount of expenditure on these subsidies.  New export subsidies are 
prohibited.  The maximum expenditure on export subsidies in developed countries 
had to be reduced by 36%, and the maximum quantity of exports that can benefit 
from the subsidies had to be reduced by 21% over six years to 2000. (WTO 
2007).  
In spite of the changes to the international trade system, and US policy 
support, US corn exports did not rise above 1996 levels.  Rather, exports fell 
sharply from 1996- 1997.  From 1997 to 1998, there was a rise in exports.  But 
from 1998 to 2000, began a slow decline to the end of the period (Figure 14).  
While commodity prices had been trending upward before the FAIR Act was 
passed, the 1996 corn price was a one year spike.  Prices immediately began to 
plummet, and by 1999 were solidly below $2/bushel (Figure 12).  Meanwhile, 
world prices followed the US prices downward.  Prices of primary agricultural 
exports (corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, and rice) declined by more than 40% from 
1996 levels through 2003 (Ray et al. 2003).   
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Farm income from the marketplace declined dramatically globally.  
Congress responded by passing a series of emergency farm bills beginning in 
October 1998.  Farmers received direct cash payments that were decoupled from 
any sort of production controls.  The result was that the US output of corn first 
declined slightly, but then rose again to historically high levels (Figure 13).  US 
net cash farm income remained relatively stable (Figure 17) but only because 
government payments ballooned from $7.5 billion in 1997 to $23.2 billion in 
2000 before declining back to $13 billion in 2004 (USDA 2009).  
The 2002 Farm Bill formalized these payments, which resulted in the 
agricultural sector receiving more aid than before the 1996 FAIR Act (Ray et al. 
2003).  The global decline brought considerable scrutiny onto US farm policy 
from the international community, and charges that agribusiness and corporate 
livestock producers were the real beneficiaries of a policy that was hurting 
farmers worldwide, but especially in developing countries (Ray et al. 2003).  The 
international community saw the 2002 Farm Bill as a retreat from earlier United 
States positions on reforming farm policy and liberalizing agricultural trade.  
Now, the United States, appeared two-faced, telling the rest of the world to cut 
their farm subsidies while increasing its own (Thompson 2005).  
The pressure on the United States continued into the next WTO round of 
negotiations, the Doha Round, which began in 2001 in Doha Qatar.  Delegates in 
Doha believed that high-income countries tend to be most protectionist in the 
sectors where low income countries have a comparative advantage.  These low 
70 
 
income advantages occurred particularly with labor intensive manufactures and 
certain agricultural products.  Since developing countries represented the majority 
of members of the WTO, any agreement in Doha would require that they clearly 
benefited.  Continued reform of agriculture became a key feature of the Doha 
Development Agenda created by the conference (Thompson 2005).  
 
 
Figure 17.  US farm income 1960 – 2008.  Note: 2008 is estimated (USDA 2009). 
 
For the oil markets, the period began with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
in 1990.  Prices rose briefly, but returned to prewar prices by 1991.  Low prices 
where depressed further with the onset of the Asian financial crisis, which began 
in 1997.  Prices were trending around about $20 per barrel, but in 1998 dipped 
briefly below $10 per barrel.  Prices remained sufficiently low that a series of 
megamergers between independent oil companies began in 1998.  More 
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significantly, for energy markets a decade later, low prices pushed new 
exploration to historically low levels (Figure 18). 
In 1999, OPEC agreed to a cut in production which began pushing prices 
higher as did the second Gulf War that began in 2003.  Demand began to return 
especially in Asia by 2004, and prices began what would become a prolonged and 
historic rise. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Worldwide rig count vs. crude oil price (1976 – 2008) (Baker Hughes 
Incorporated 2010, BP 2010).  Red represents the oil price, and blue represents the rig 
count. 
 
On the environmental front, concern about anthropogenic interference in 
the climate system through greenhouse gas emissions reached a sufficient level 
that the United Nations held the Conference on Environment and Development in 
June of 1992, which became known as the Earth Summit.  The purpose of the 
conference was to agree to a treaty to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases.  
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The agreement that was reached is known as the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
The treaty itself set no mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions and 
is legally non-binding.  The treaty provided for updates that could be agreed to by 
a “Conference of the Parties” (COP).  These updates, or protocols, were expected 
to set more rigorous standards.  The best known of the protocols to date is the 
Kyoto Protocol, which set goals especially for developed countries, but they were 
again non-binding.  The treaty entered into effect in 1994 and currently has 192 
parties. 
3.4.2 Support for Biofuels 
Production of bioethanol continued to rise rapidly during the time period, 
as the market for MTBE declined following banning in several states, which 
opened up the opportunity for ethanol as an oxygenated fuel additive (see Table 
9).  The decline of 30,000 barrels from the peak of MTBE use in 1999 to 2004, 
was largely made up by bioethanol.  Biofuel, and especially bioethanol, continued 
to benefit from stable government support in the form of subsidies (see Table 10). 
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          Table 9.  Annual production of MTBE (EIA 2009c). 
Date 
U.S. MTBE Oxygenate Total  
Production  
(Thousand Barrels) 
1992 36828 
1993 49528 
1994 52490 
1995 59670 
1996 67752 
1997 71933 
1998 75072 
1999 78826 
2000 77460 
2001 77510 
2002 74604 
2003 61274 
2004 48100 
2005 47374 
2006 30698 
2007 21706 
2008 17319 
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Table 10.  US federal government support for biofuels (Koplow, 2006; Duffield, 2008). 
Support Date 
Enacted 
Authority 
40¢/gal  Tax Exemption 1978 Energy Tax Act of 1978 
40¢/gal blenders credit* 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 
1980 
Loans to small ethanol plants 
producing less than one million 
gallons per year 
1980 The Energy Security Act 
50¢/gal; 9¢/gal for ≥E85 1983 Surface Transportation Assistance 
Act 
60¢/gal exemption 1984 Tax Reform Act of 1984 
6¢/gal for ≥E85 of 1986 1986 Tax Reform Act 
Credits to auto makers towards 
meeting CAFE standards for 
producing alternative and dual-fuel 
vehicles 
1988 The Alternative Motor Fuels Act 
54¢/gal blenders credit 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 
2% oxygen required ethanol 
became a oxygenate for producers 
to blend with gasoline to meet air 
quality 
1990 Clean Air ActAmendments; 
Oxygenated Fuels and Reformulated 
Gasoline Programs 
54¢/gal net (4.16¢/gal of 7.7% 
blend; 3.08¢/gal of 5.7% blend) 
 
1992 Energy Policy Act of 1992 (extended 
pro-rated exemptions to lower 
blends) of ethanol E5.7 and E7.7. 
Ethanol blends with diesel, and 
ethanol produced from natural gas 
Title IX created a range of 
programs to promote bioenergy 
and bioproduct production and 
consumption. 
2002 The Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 
USDA made $150 million/yr 
available for ethanol and biodiesel 
producers who expanded 
production 
2003-06 U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) Bioenergy Program 
53¢/gal 
52¢/gal 
51¢/gal 
2001-02 
2003-04 
2005-07 
Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century initiated pre-scheduled 
reductions in the exemptions. 
Reduction set in 1997 by the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1997 
51¢/gal 
 
2005 
 
American JOBS Creation Act of 
2004 replaces the excise tax 
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exemption with a Volumetric Ethanol 
Excise Tax Exemption 
Renewable fuels standard requires  
a minimum amount of renewable 
fuel each year, starting at 4 billion 
gallons in 2006 and reaching 7.5 
billion gallons in 2012. 
2005 Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
Expansion of the renewable fuel 
standard to 36 billion gallons a 
year of ethanol by 2022 
2008 Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 
 
For the first time in my analysis all five action arenas are now present, and 
have a broad impact relevant to biofuels.  The substantial concern about climate 
change and greenhouse gases, led directly to the creation of the UNFCCC 
following the Earth Summit in 1992.  The UNFCCC, created the foundation for 
global policy making with respect to the climate.  During this time period, the 
deliberations of the UNFCCC had minimal impact on the other action arenas, and, 
therefore, on corn ethanol.  No direct linkages between corn ethanol and 
greenhouse gas reduction were actively promoted, but the stage was set for this 
linkage in the following time period.  The WTO impact was also minimal on 
bioethanol, because no major policy options emerged supporting or not 
supporting bioethanol during this period.  This is not the case for the US Federal 
Government, where the importance of both the UNFCCC and WTO action arenas 
on US policy was being felt.   
The grain market was experiencing extreme volatility, and generally, 
downward pressure on farm incomes resulting in high federal budget deficits.  For 
the first time in the scope of this analysis, the oil markets experienced relative 
geopolitical stability, but price volatility on the down side was unsettling for 
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industry players.  Security concerns were, therefore, substantially diminished 
compared to earlier periods.  In spite of the reduced pressure on the Federal 
government regarding energy security, the emergence of the WTO and UNFCCC 
action arenas, combined with the extreme pressure coming from rural states 
because of low grain prices, led to a complex policy environment.  This complex 
policy environment, in turn, led to a number of policy interventions in support of 
biofuels, see Table 10.  Of particular note, is the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, that opened a way for ethanol as a fuel oxygenate. Other policy 
interventions included tax subsidies for blending and investment support for 
expanding production.  
3.5 From 2005 To Present 
3.5.1 Exogenous Variables 
Corn prices began the period at about $2.00 per bushel, but rocketed to 
nearly $5.00 per bushel by 2008.  Farm income fell in 2005 and 2006, before 
rebounding to historically high levels in 2008, as corn prices and commodity 
prices generally moved to unprecedented highs.  The rise was so steep, that the 
higher food prices sparked riots in many countries in 2008, and according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), at least 40 
governments imposed emergency measures, such as food price controls or export 
restrictions (FAO 2008). 
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Figure 19.  Long term food and energy price trends, real and nominal (FAO 2008). 
 
The FAO index of nominal food prices doubled between 2002 and 2008. 
The nominal index reached its highest level in the last 3 decades.  The real index, 
which is adjusted in order to assess how price increases affect consumers, showed 
its first substantial rise after four decades of decline (Figure 19).  By mid- 2008, 
real food prices were 64% above the levels of 2002 (FAO 2008).  Among the 
factors responsible for the rise in commodity prices were higher production costs, 
due to higher petroleum prices, production shortfalls, and strong demand growth – 
especially for biofuels.   
In the Doha negotiations, the United States position was complex.  On the 
one hand, most experts agreed that the US exceeded its support limits in 1999 and 
2000, yet US negotiators continued to press for market opening reforms.  The 
disconnect between Congress and the Bush administration negotiators arose 
largely because among farm organizations, there was little support for trade 
reform.  Exports did not get a big boost from the Uruguay round agreements and 
remained volatile (Figure 14).  Farm organizations saw more potential in biofuels 
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than in exports.  Without the support of farm organizations, there was no real 
incentive for Congress to make the changes in farm policy necessary to meet the 
spirit of Doha.  The degree of misalignment became very apparent when Congress 
passed the 2008 Farm Bill, called the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008.  This bill returned to many of the earlier farm support policies, and is 
generally seen to be non-compliant with the direction of Doha (Murphy and 
Suppan 2008).  
The concern about climate reached a new level with the publication of the 
fourth assessment report of the IPCC in 2007.  Some of the key conclusions of 
that report were (IPCC 2007): 
 Warming of the climate system is unequivocal.  
 Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures 
since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic (human) greenhouse gas concentrations.  
 Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for 
centuries due to the timescales associated with climate processes and 
feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be 
stabilized, although the likely amount of temperature and sea level 
rise varies greatly depending on the fossil intensity of human activity 
during the next century. 
 The probability that this is caused by natural climatic processes alone 
is less than 5%.  
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 World temperatures could rise by between 1.1 and 6.4 °C (2.0 and 
11.5 °F) during the 21st century and that:  
 Both past and future anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will 
continue to contribute to warming and sea level rise for more than a 
millennium.  
Contrary to what is often believed, Annex I countries have been on track 
to meet the Kyoto target of 5.2% reduction by 2012.  The national inventories 
reported to the UN show an aggregate reduction of 3.9 % by the Annex I Parties, 
if changes from land use, land-use change and forestry are excluded and 5.2% if 
these affects are included (UNFCC Subsidiary Body For Implementation 2009).  
This level of reduction, however, is made up of widely varying reductions among 
individual countries and is trending upward (Figure 20).    
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Figure 20.  Changes in GHG emissions including LULUCF (%).  LULUCF = land use, land-use 
change and forestry (UNFCC Subsidiary Body For Implementation 2009). 
 
Total global emissions however continue rise.  The US in particular has 
had a steep increase over this time period.  Attempts to reinvigorate the UNFCCC 
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process, and to reach a new accord with more aggressive targets that would bring 
total global emissions down, have thus far largely failed. 
In the oil markets, the dramatic run up in price that began in 2005, and 
culminated in a price of more than $145 per barrel in July of 2008, before an even 
more precipitous decline, qualifies as one of the most extraordinary periods in the 
industry history.  Much has been written about the cause of the spectacular rise 
and fall, but without a widely accepted conclusion.   
A number of authors have argued it was largely a supply and demand 
phenomenon.  Dees et al. (2008) for example, evaluated the time period between 
2004 and 2006, and concluded that the price rise in that period was largely due to 
concern about supply.  During the period, the world oil production capacity was 
operated at a higher than normal level, and when combined with market 
expectations that oil could be in short supply in the future, oil prices were pushed 
higher (Dees et al. 2008).  Hamilton (2009), similarly argued that the price rise 
was the result of a supply/demand dynamic that went out of balance because of a 
failure of production capacity to keep pace with growing demand between 2005 
and 2007.  He points particularly to the lack of increase in production capacity in 
Saudi Arabia, and in fact, a decline in their output in 2007, as indicative of the 
problem.  As with Dees, Hamilton (2009) points out the physiological effect on 
markets, of Saudi Arabia not balancing supply and demand, by adjusting both its 
production capacity and its monthly output.  With demand from developing 
countries rising, and supply stagnate, price had to rise to push demand down 
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enough to balance.  The change in demand came from declines in Europe and the 
US. 
Others, especially in the popular press, argued that the rapid rise in price 
resulted from speculation, particularly by hedge funds in the United States (see 
for example Krugman (2009)).  Kaufmann and Ullman (2009), recently found a 
mechanism for how speculation in the futures market could be transmitted to the 
spot market, and thus, affect short term prices without building large inventories 
(Kaufmann and Ullman 2009). 
Concern about speculation was sufficiently wide spread that investigations 
were undertaken by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 
2006, where they found, “...there is substantial evidence supporting the 
conclusion that the large amount of speculation in the current market has 
significantly increased prices.”  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 
2008, also undertook a study, but in a November 2009 statement, reported no 
evidence for excessive speculation. 
Oil prices are currently at historically high levels, though well off the 
records set in 2008.  The Energy Information Agency of the DOE, forecasts a 
price of $75 for 2010, and a 2030 reference case forecast of $130 per barrel real 
2007 dollars. 
Energy security came to the forefront again.  The dislocation between 
where oil and gas reserves are located and where oil and gas are consumed 
heightened geopolitical concern.  In his 2006, State of the Union address 
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President Bush put forward a goal to “replace more than 75% of our oil imports 
from the Middle East by 2025”.  He went on to say that, “by applying the talent 
and technology of America, this country can dramatically improve our 
environment, move beyond a petroleum-based economy, and make our 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.”  During the 2008 
Presidential campaign, both presidential candidates also made pledges to reduce 
dependence on foreign sources of oil.  John McCain pledged to achieve “strategic 
independence” while Barack Obama pledged to reduce imports by an amount 
equivalent to the supplies coming from Venezuela and the Middle East.  The 
geopolitical risk of dependence was exacerbated when Russia interrupted gas 
supply to the Ukraine, and thus Europe, in January of 2009.   
Of particular importance to ethanol, was the change in law that required 
oxygenates for reformulated gasoline in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and 
allowed companies to meet the clean air standards in any way they chose.  In 
response, the oil companies made a big push to use ethanol in place of methyl-
tertiary butyl ether, which was considered by some as highly toxic and was 
banned in many states.  Demand for ethanol rose sharply as did the price.  Ethanol 
reached an all time high wholesale price of $3.58/gal before falling back.  The 
average wholesale price in 2009, fell below $2.00/gal for the first time since 2005 
(Figure 21). 
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Figure 21.  Average annual wholesale ethanol FOB price, Omaha, Nebraska, where the FOB price 
is the Free on Board price, which is the price actually charged at the point of loading (Official 
Nebraska Government Website 2010). 
 
3.5.2 Support for Biofuels 
Federal Government support for first generation biofuel remained strong.  
In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush put forward a goal to 
“replace more than 75% of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025”.  He 
went on to say that “by applying the talent and technology of America, this 
country can dramatically improve our environment, move beyond a petroleum-
based economy, and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the 
past.”  The Energy Policy Act of 2005, mandated the use of biofuels for 
transportation in the United States (See Table 11).   
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Table 11.  Mandated Volumes of Renewable Fuel (Billions of gallons) under The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (U.S. Congress 2005). 
Mandate Year Volume 
2006 4.0 
2007 4.7 
2008 5.4 
2009 6.1 
2010 6.8 
2011 7.4 
2012 7.5 
 
The targets in the mandate are aggressive and are supported by subsidies 
for production that are large and have been in place for nearly 30 years to make 
investment in ethanol production attractive.   
Yet, bioethanol has come under intense scrutiny over the last three years 
as scholars have explored both the contribution of bioethanol to greenhouse gas 
mitigation and energy security.  While debate has been intense and results at times 
contradictory, a consensus seems to be emerging that bioethanol from corn makes 
only a very small contribution to both net energy or to greenhouse gas mitigation 
in the United States (Pimentel 2003, Hill et al. 2006, Tilman et al. 2006, Righelato 
and Spracklen 2007).    
The small contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation may at first seem odd, 
as the fuel is derived from biomass that was itself created by plants fixing 
atmospheric carbon dioxide.  While true, this renewable origin is only part of the 
story.  Energy is expended in making ethanol from raw biomass which in the 
United States mainly comes from fossil fuels.  Consuming these fuels both 
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reduces the net energy benefit and releases greenhouse gases.  Equally important, 
corn production requires large amounts of nitrogen fertilizers.  According to Hill 
et al. (2006), when all factors are considered in a full cycle analysis, corn grain 
ethanol releases 88% of the net GHG emissions of production and combustion of 
an energetically equivalent amount of gasoline.      
Turning then to energy benefit, the net energy benefit of corn derived 
ethanol has been hotly debated in the literature.  Patzek et al. (2005) and Pimentel 
(2003), concluded that for corn ethanol the full cycle net energy benefit is 
negative.  Subsequently, more work by other investigators has converged on a 
consensus view that the net energy benefit is positive but not large.  The results of 
Hill et al. (2006), are indicative of the view that bioethanol from corn has a 
positive net benefit in the range of 25%, but that benefit is highly dependent on 
the energy benefit assigned to the byproduct distillers dried grain and solubles 
(DDGS). 
Even with a positive benefit for energy and emissions, other authors have 
questioned the cost effectiveness of making the investments.  Rubin et al. (2008), 
looked at the cost per ton of carbon dioxide reduction, and the cost per mBTU to 
reduce the use of fossil fuel and petroleum energy.  Their results are shown in 
Table 12 below.  The first thing to note from these results is the very large 
variation in cost to reduce fossil energy use and GHG emissions.  In both cases, 
cellulosic ethanol produces much lower costs for reductions, and current ethanol 
production units are a very expensive way to make reductions.  In contrast, the 
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variation is not so large between technologies for reduction of petroleum use.  
This is probably not accidental, as the system of support for ethanol production is 
at least in part designed to replace oil imports.     
 
Table 12.  Current compensation provided by the blenders credit to services provided by different 
systems (Rubin et al. 2008). 
Fuel 
Petroleu
m 
Technology/ 
Feedstock 
FossilEnergy 
Reduction 
($/mBtu) 
Petroleum 
Energy 
Reduction 
($/mBtu) 
GHG Emission 
Reduction 
($/ton) 
     
Avg. EtoH Current 14.7 6.6 350.8 
 Future 14.5 6.6 321.5 
New EtoH  NG-DDGS 13.5 6.5 241.2 
 NG-WDGS 10.4 6.5 175.4 
 Coal-DDGS 17.0 6.6 * 
 Coal-WDGS 11.4 6.6 367.5 
Cellulosic 
EtoH  
Switchgrass 6.0 6.5 79.6 
 Corn Stover 6.0 6.4 78.7 
Biodiesel  Soybean Oil 11.7 8.2 134.9 
* GHG emissions increased compared to gasoline by using ethanol produced in natural gas or coal-fired plant 
that has co-products.  WDGS = wet distillers grains with solubles.  DDGS = dried distillers grains with 
solubles.  NG = natural gas. 
 
The second thing to note is just how high these costs are.  The lowest cost 
for greenhouse gas reduction is just under $80/ton with technology not fully 
commercialized and with current technology estimated at about $350/ton.  This 
compares with an early 2008 market price for one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent on the Chicago Climate Exchange of $1.90/ton for 2010 delivery and a 
2006 estimate by McKinsey (Enkvist et al. 2007) that a $40/ton price for CO2 
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emissions would be enough to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm.  Clearly, the 
market price falls short. 
Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have examined the 
economic implications for energy security of imported oil (Greene and Leiby 
2006, Leiby 2007).  Greene and Leiby (2006), have examined a number of 
different analytical approaches to assessing quantitatively the economic cost of 
high imports.  Leiby adopts and develops one of the approaches, a marginal cost 
approach, which considers the cost that would be caused by a marginal (small 
incremental) change in oil imports from the current level, and thus, is an 
indication of what price we should be willing to pay to achieve a small change.  
Marginal cost should be a simple guide for incremental policy.  These researchers 
could only identify ranges of savings, as exact estimates are subject to 
assumptions that are not easily quantified.  Even using the high estimates, 
however, the savings did not offset the costs of ethanol from corn subsidies. 
In addition to the benefits for energy security and greenhouse gas emission 
reduction, supporters of biofuels also argued that they provided benefits to rural 
communities and farmers.  Though support to rural communities, and especially 
farmers, are also seen as an important goal, just how the support for biofuel aids 
rural communities came into question.  Rubin et al. 2008, argued that while 
legislation supporting biofuels tends to focus on energy security and the 
environment, the real reason for the broad support is support to farmers and 
landowners (Rubin et al. 2008).  In his assessment, the only way to make sense of 
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the size of the subsidies is as a mechanism to raise commodity prices and attract 
land currently fallow in set aside programs into production.    
Miranoski (2007), argues along a similar line pointing out that higher 
commodities prices transfer money to farmers and landowners, and takes pressure 
off highly visible farm programs.  Both of these lines of argument require that the 
ultimate beneficiary of the subsidy is the farmer and landowners.  I make the 
distinction here between benefit from higher prices and benefit from the subsidy, 
as higher prices clearly benefit farmers and landowners, whereas subsidies may or 
may not depending on how rent is shared among corn producers, ethanol 
producers, and fuel blenders.   
Analyses by  Taheripour and Tyner (2007) and by Rubin et al. (2008), 
suggest that currently, and for the foreseeable future, the beneficiaries of the 
current subsidy is mainly the ethanol producer.  They found that the impact on 
rural development is at best mixed, and may actually result in fewer jobs.  With 
payments drawn from the general public in the form of lower tax revenues, and 
from future generations in the form of government debt, it is hard to justify why 
$7 to $9 billion should be transferred from these economic interests to ethanol 
producers for no net gain in social benefit.   
An additional line of concern arose due to the very rapid run up in grain 
and food prices, i.e., the potential for food and fuel competition.  Tilman et al. 
(2006), estimated that in 2005, 14.3% of the US corn harvest was used to produce 
4.0 billion gallons of ethanol, which was energetically equivalent to just 1.72% of 
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U.S demand for gasoline.  Johansson and Azar (2007), published the results of an 
economic model of the U.S. agricultural and energy system to assess the possible 
competition for land and to examine the link between carbon prices, the energy 
system, and food prices.  Their results indicated that bioenergy plantations will be 
competitive on cropland already at carbon taxes about US $20/ton C.  As the 
carbon tax increased, food prices more than doubled compared to the reference 
scenario in which there is no climate policy.  They also found that, bioenergy 
plantations appropriate significant areas of both cropland and grazing land 
(Johansson and Azar 2007).  
By 2008, the UN was sufficiently concerned to request a review of 
biofuels policy in the United States and Europe, because of the extremely high 
food prices.  As reported by Rosenthal (2008), Jacques Diouf, the executive 
director of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization urged that 
current policies should be “urgently reviewed in order to preserve the goal of 
world food security, protect poor farmers, promote broad-based rural 
development and ensure environmental sustainability.” 
This statement contrasted sharply with the views of the US Department of 
Agriculture which earlier released a study that showed "high energy prices, 
increasing global demand, drought and other factors -- not biofuels -- are the 
primary drivers of higher food costs."  Secretary Schafer went on to say, 
"Developing diversity in our portfolio of fuels is if anything an even more urgent 
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matter than it has been in the past.  And it is one that remains central to our 
energy security and our national security," (USDA 2008).    
That the USDA would come out squarely behind the production of biofuel 
and corn ethanol is perhaps not too surprising.  A little more than a year earlier in 
his 2007 State of the Union address President Bush stated, “It‟s in our vital 
interest to diversify America‟s energy supply - the way forward is through 
technology.  We must continue changing the way America generates electric 
power, by even greater use of …solar and wind energy...We must continue 
investing in new methods of producing ethanol, using everything from wood 
chips to grasses, to agricultural wastes…Let us build on the work we‟ve done and 
reduce gasoline usage in the United States by 20% in the next 10 years...To reach 
this goal, we must increase the supply of alternative fuels, by setting a mandatory 
fuels standard to require 35 billion gallons of renewable and alternative fuels in 
2017.”  Following on from this challenge, Congress passed the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 in December 2007.  A key provision of 
the Act is a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) to thirty-six 
billion gallons a year of ethanol by 2022, with no more than fifteen billion gallons 
coming from corn or other grains and no less than twenty-one billion gallons 
coming from cellulosic feedstock in that final year. 
The US Government stood solidly behind biofuels including bioethanol 
from grain, but the renewed emphasis on biofuels from non-food crops, which 
also appeared in the Energy Act of 2005, did signal a recognition that grain could 
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not be the sole or even the majority feedstock for a meaningful biofuel industry in 
the United States.    
In the period 2005 to present, all five action arenas are active and are 
interactive with each other.  They are also all directly impacting on the role of 
biofuel and in particular grain ethanol as a fuel for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in transportation, and improving domestic and international energy 
security.  One of the features of the interaction among the action arenas is we now 
begin to see is an element of friction.  For example, big agriculture food 
manufacturers whose interests are better served by low to moderate grain prices 
bristled at the very high price spike of corn in 2008, and the perceived role corn 
ethanol played in it.  This put the food manufacturers at odds with the federal 
government and their policy of supporting rapid growth of corn based ethanol.  
The extraordinary run up in oil price re-ignited energy security concerns and 
unlike previous crisis where geopolitical events in the Middle East were behind 
the spikes in price, this run up in price couldn‟t easily be attributed to any single 
factor.  Rather, it seemed to be driven by a combination of factors including 
prolonged increases in demand for crude not matched by increases in investment 
to increase supply, aggressive oil trading practices by international firms, and a 
certain amount of “going with the herd”.  We also begin to see the impact of 
national policies in countries with large reserves that limited investment in the oil 
sector.   
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In the WTO, the Doha round now has as a core feature, agriculture reform.  
The US position in the Doha round was complex, and in the eyes of some 
inconsistent, since they tried to preserve farm subsidies while encouraging open 
trade with developing nations.  Finally, the UNFCCC, and the focus the climate 
negotiations brought on greenhouse gas emissions, created a very complex 
environment for corn ethanol.  While promoters of the fuel attempted to champion 
the green credentials of ethanol, a growing body of evidence suggested marginal 
benefits if any at all. Thus, the direction of UNFCCC research work, under the 
IPCC and in laboratories around the world, also brought this action arena into 
direct conflict with US Federal Government policy to promote corn ethanol.  
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CHAPTER 4 
AN EMERGING SHIFT IN POLICY ON BIOFUELS 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last section we saw that in the United States there was a long history 
of support for corn based ethanol that could be understood in terms of the action 
arenas:  US Federal Government, oil markets, grain markets, UNFCCC, and the 
WTO.  Actions taken by participants in these arenas drove outcomes that lead to 
changes in policy and market dynamics.  The relative importance of these arenas 
varied over time, but until the late 1990‟s they all tended to be aligned and 
significantly supportive of corn based ethanol in the United States.  In the early 
2000s, it became clear that the complications associated with first generation 
biofuels, and corn based ethanol in particular, were too numerous and too severe 
to overlook.  All these complicating factors serve as exogenous variables into one 
or more of the action arenas.  In this way, the outcomes of one become critical 
variables to another.   
In this chapter, I will explore my second core question:  There are calls 
coming from stakeholders to end support for first generation biofuels by 
governments.  What is the justification for a shift in policy?  I will explore in 
more detail the complications and criticisms in a global context.  Also, I will show 
how these factors become exogenous variables to the action arenas, and how they 
impact policy shifts which are shaping the future of biofuels. 
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The primary criticisms of first generation biofuels largely fall into five 
broad categories:  competition for food supplies, energy and net energy balance, 
land use change, net emissions savings, and competition for water.  I will briefly 
review each. 
4.2 Primary Criticisms of First Generation Biofuels  
4.2.1 Competition for Food Supplies 
 Competition for food supplies, became an exogenous variable in several 
action arenas.  It affected the grain market due to supply and demand and in 
particular the way that imbalances affected grain price.  In the US Federal 
Government it set off a number of food versus fuel related investigations.  Finally, 
it became an issue for the UNFCCC because of concerns over land use change. 
Competition for food supplies did not play as largely into the WTO, as the DOHA 
round  negotiations were stalled during the large run up in food prices.  
As noted above, biofuels were implicated in the extreme rise in food 
prices in 2008.  The very real potential for bioenergy to draw down the world‟s 
biomass stocks and especially food stocks emerged.  This raised concerns about 
food/fuel competition, and the potential for bioenergy to cause price increases in 
food commodities, or worse, actually drive food stocks for human consumption 
below safe levels, and take food supplies away from the world‟s poorest people 
(Boddiger 2007, Rist et al. 2009).  Biofuels were, and to a certain extent still are, 
believed to be a source of rural development and empowerment by providing jobs 
for the poor nations and peoples (Boddiger 2007).  However, increasingly 
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negative reports concerning social justice especially with respect to access to 
adequate food supplies has emerged (Boddiger 2007, Charles et al. 2007, Runge 
and Senauer 2007, Rist et al. 2009). 
Comestible biofuel crops pose a serious threat to the world‟s poor.  While 
biofuel food crops provide additional income to farmers, especially in developing 
countries, these same farmers may also struggle to afford food due to escalating 
food prices (Boddiger 2007).  Runge and Senauer (2007), estimated that if biofuel 
production continued business as usual, that the number of food insecure people 
“would rise by over 16 million for every percentage increase in the real price of 
staple foods.”  This would increase the number of the world‟s chronically hungry 
to 1.2 billion.  They further reported that the use of cassava as a feed stock would 
increase its price by 33% by 2010 and 135% by 2020.  Cassava is a staple in the 
poorest regions of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America.   
In January 2007, Mexico‟s president Felipe Calderon was required to cap 
the prices for corn products due to increases in corn price.  In late 2006, the price 
of tortilla flour in Mexico, who gets 80% of their corn from the U.S., doubled.  
The doubling in price occurred due to a combination of the U.S. corn price 
increasing from $2.80 to $4.20 a bushel, speculation, and hoarding (Runge and 
Senauer 2007).  Vernon Eidman, of University of Minnesota, reported that higher 
feed costs will negatively affect the livestock and poultry industry by causing a 
steep fall in returns in these industries, particularly poultry and swine sectors.  If 
these drops in return continue, Eidman projects, the price for poultry, pork, milk, 
97 
 
and eggs will rise, and in the next few years, some of Iowa‟s pork producers may 
be forced out of business due to competition for corn from biofuels.  Ultimately, 
these effects will be passed on to the consumer purchasing these foodstuffs 
(Runge and Senauer 2007). 
Biofuels also have implications for the quality of the food supply.  Some 
scientists have issue with biofuel co-products, which are used as a carbon offset.  
In some cases, such as corn, scientists have pointed out the potential of 
mycotoxins to become up to three times more concentrated in the co-products, 
distillers‟ dry grains, and wet distillers‟ grain.  The toxins can cause serious health 
consequences for the poultry and livestock fed these products, which may cause 
further economic losses for the poultry and livestock industry (Biksey and Wu 
2009). 
4.2.2 Energy and Net Energy Balance 
Energy and net energy balance are exogenous variables that played mainly 
into the US Federal Government action arena.  Low net energy balance created 
concerns which altered the overall attractiveness of bioethanol as a replacement 
fuel, and its contribution to energy security. 
Ethanol as a fuel is not as desirable as gasoline.  The energy balance of 
ethanol to petrol is less than a 1:1 ratio.  According to Brown (2003), on a 
volumetric basis, ethanol has only 66% of the thermal content of gasoline, thereby 
reducing the range of a vehicle operating solely on ethanol.  Additionally, the 
hygroscopic nature of pure ethanol and its ability to mix with water, can lead to 
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water-induced phase separation in gasoline blends, which is a drawback to this 
fuel type.  If not kept completely isolated from the atmosphere, water can be 
absorbed, resulting in a lower layer composed primarily of water and an upper 
layer of hydrocarbon.  This is a problem in blending and distribution.  Thus, 
pipeline distribution and long-term ethanol storage creates many, but manageable 
issues.  Of more importance, is the net energy benefit of ethanol. 
The net energy benefit of corn derived ethanol has been hotly debated in 
the literature.  Pimentel and co-authors concluded that for corn ethanol the full 
cycle net energy benefit is negative (Pimentel 2003, Patzek and Pimentel 2005).  
Subsequently, more work by other investigators has converged on a consensus 
view that the net energy benefit is positive, but not large.  The results of Hill et al. 
(2006), are indicative of the view that bioethanol from corn has a positive net 
energy benefit in the range of 25%, but that benefit is highly dependent on the 
energy benefit assigned to the byproduct distillers dried grain and solubles 
(DDGS) (see Figure 22).     
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Figure 22.  Energy balance for biofuels.  NEB is the net energy benefit (Hill et al. 2006). 
 
It should be noted, that net energy benefit alone is not the final indicator of 
the effect of bioethanol on energy security.  The reason this is the case is because 
much of the energy used to produce bioethanol comes from coal and natural gas.  
Energy from fossil fuels is expended in making ethanol from raw biomass which 
reduces the net energy and greenhouse gases benefit.  In effect, the corn ethanol 
system converts coal and natural gas, neither of which makes good transport fuels, 
into ethanol which is an acceptable transport fuel.  Thus, while the net benefit 
may not be large, the substitution benefit is more meaningful. 
Tilman et al. (2006), estimated that in 2005, 14.3% of the US corn harvest 
produced 14.8 billion liters (4 billion gallons) of ethanol, which was energetically 
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equivalent to 1.72% of the U.S. requirement.  While this is not a large fraction of 
the US requirement, the biofuels mandate for the US is 36 billion gallons by 2022, 
most of which will come from ethanol.  36 bilion gallons corresponds to about 
136 billion liters.  Since gasoline is produced exclusively from oil, ethanol would 
indirectly substitute for oil imports.  At a level of 36 billion gallons, substitution 
could begin to be meaningful in considering oil pricing, and it certainly would be 
at 136 billion liters (110th U.S. Congress. 2007). 
Based on the use of corn for ethanol in 2005, Tilman extrapolated to 
determine that the entire 2005 U.S. corn and soybean crop would have offset 12% 
and 6.0% of U.S. gasoline and diesel demand, respectively.  When energy of 
production was taken into account a net energy gain equivalent to 2.4% and 2.9% 
of U.S. gasoline and diesel was all that would have been achieved.  Perhaps 15% 
of the US corn crop and 2% of soybeans can be sustainably turned over to fuel 
production, but certainly the entire crop cannot be, even in the service of national 
security and especially for such a small gain.  Von Lampe (2006), has made 
similar estimates for land use requirements for replacing 10% of petroleum motor 
fuels with biofuels in other countries (Figure 23).   
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Figure 23.  Biofuel shares in transport fuel consumption and land requirements for 10% biofuel 
shares in major biofuel producing regions (Von Lampe 2006). 
 
In developing countries with small demand for motor fuel and large land 
areas (Brazil and Poland), the requirement for land is not outrageous 3% for 
Brazil and 6% for Poland, but 30% for the US and 72% for the EU-15 is 
unrealistic (Von Lampe 2006).    
4.2.3 Land-Use Change 
Land use change was an exogenous variable largely into the UNFCCC 
action arena, although awareness within the US Federal Government of the 
potential for very serious negative consequences of indirect land use change was 
real.  Of particular concern, was land clearance in developing countries for food 
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crops redirected in the US toward biofuel production.  The greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with land clearance can be very large as noted earlier in this 
thesis.  
New markets, food shortages, and higher prices are key market drivers 
which not surprisingly stimulate farmers to respond ultimately through 
intensification to drive up yields, or through expansion by converting land from 
other uses to the production of bioenergy crops or food and fodder.  The affect is 
direct in the case of plant foodstuffs for human consumption, but indirect as the 
livestock and poultry industry are affected by the use of fodder for biofuel 
production.  A new source of demand for animal feed will either drive up costs for 
fodder, which will be passed onto the consumer, or require further land clearance 
to accommodate the land lost to the biofuel feedstock.  This latter effect, though 
signaled by ecologists, was not well understood when policies were set in the US 
and Europe.  Since then, it has become clear that commodity price signals 
originating in the US and Europe can and probably do drive land use changes as 
far away as South America and South Asia.  When the land use changes involve 
widespread deforestation or conversion of wetlands, the environmental 
consequences can be dire –far out weighing any of the primary benefits of biofuel.  
Additionally, the intuitive expectation that biofuels would reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases proved not universally true.  The source of the biomass, GHG 
balances associated with land conversion (Righelato and Spracklen 2007, Melillo 
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et al. 2009), and the land resources/inputs used to grow biomass, all matter 
(Charles et al. 2007).   
Other emergent issues are land rights in agricultural expansion and 
adoption of “abandoned and degraded” land.  It is not uncommon in poor nations  
that perceived abandoned land actually to be in use by poor locals, or to act as 
important habitat for native species.  Additionally, large commercial agriculture 
can often out-compete small local farmers (Boddiger 2007, Rist et al. 2009) and 
effectively push them out of lands they traditionally occupied.  Also, degraded 
land often requires higher use of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and fungicides 
to boost productivity to commercially attractive levels (Patzek et al., 2005, 
Spangenberg and Settele 2009).  This change in practice can have environmental 
consequences, and does have an impact on net emissions of greenhouse gases.  
Pesticide, herbicides, and fungicides are associated with the destruction of flora 
and fauna and are commonly toxic to humans, while increased use of fertilizers 
often leads to eutrophication and higher emissions of nitrogen oxides. 
4.2.4 Net Emissions Savings 
Net  emissions savings are an exogenous variable in the US Federal 
Government and UNFCCC.  Greenhouse gas abatement was one reason why 
bioethanol was supported by both action arenas initially.  Given that net emissions 
savings for corn bioethanol was little to none, support for the fuel in the UNFCCC 
became largely non-existent, and in the US Federal Government this reality 
created policy complications.  
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While again debate has been intense and results at times contradictory, a 
consensus seems to be emerging that bioethanol from corn makes only a very 
small contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation in the United States.  The 
disadvantages for corn ethanol are the need for large inputs (such as process heat, 
fertilizer, pesticides, and water).  Some scientists, like Pimental, argue that the 
inputs simply outweigh the outputs.  According to Hill et al. 2006,  “N 
fertilization can cause microbial mediated production and release of N2O, which 
is a potent GHG”, in combination with nitrogen runoff associated with fertilizer 
usage, which also releases N2O, any GHG gains of the biofuel itself are largely 
lost (Patzek et al. 2005, Spangenberg and Settele 2009).   
Farrel et al. (2006), created Figures 24, 25, and 26, comparing the various 
energy inputs and related GHGs emission measurements for different studies.  
Scientists contributing studies included Pimentel, Patzek, Graboski, de Oliveira, 
Wang and Shapouri.  Not surprisingly, the values ranged significantly between 
studies.  Some reported ethanol produced notably less GHGs than gasoline 
(Shapouri and Wang), while others reported notably more (Pimental).  A similar 
disparity was found with petroleum inputs with Pimental reporting higher values 
and Shapouri the lowest values.  Following the publication of Farrel et al. (2006), 
the journal Science published an erratum beneath the article. The Ethanol Today 
values were corrected after it was realized the lime application in their study had 
been miscalculated and uncertainties emerged regarding the emissions factor of 
lime and nitrous oxide resulting from nitrogen fertilizer application.  This changed 
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the point estimate of net GHGs for corn ethanol to 18% below conventional 
gasoline rather than 15%.  However, the uncertainty band expanded to -36% to 
+29%.  
 
Figure 24.  Ethanol‟s net energy and net greenhouse gases for six studies and three cases (Farrell 
et al. 2006).  Small light blue circles are reported data that include incommensurate assumptions, 
whereas the large dark blue circles are adjusted values that use identical system boundaries.  The 
Energy and Resources Group Biofuel Analysis Meta-Model (EBAMM) was used to create a direct 
comparison of the data and assumptions across the studies. 
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Figure 25.  Ethanol‟s net energy and petroleum input for six studies and three cases (Farrell et al. 
2006).  As in Figure 24, small light blue circles are reported data that include incommensurate 
assumptions, whereas the large dark blue circles are adjusted values that use identical system 
boundaries.  The Energy and Resources Group Biofuel Analysis Meta-Model (EBAMM) was used 
to create a direct comparison of the data and assumptions across the studies. 
 
 
Figure 26.  Alternative metrics for evaluating ethanol based on the intensity or primary energy 
inputs (MJ) per MJ of  fuel and of net greenhouse gas emissions (kg CO2-equivalent) per MJ of 
fuel (Farrell et al. 2006). 
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Fargione et al. (2008), conducted a study analyzing the carbon debt 
associated with converting rainforests, peatlands, savannas, or grasslands to 
produce food crop–based biofuels in Brazil, Southeast Asia, and the United States 
(Figure 27).  The authors calculated, that soils and plant biomass are the two 
largest biologically active stores of terrestrial carbon.  Combined, soils and 
biomass contain roughly 2.7 times more carbon than the atmosphere.  However, 
this CO2 is released during conversion of native habitats to cropland.  This occurs 
as a result of burning, or microbial decomposition of organic carbon, that had 
been stored in the plant biomass and soils.  Fargione et al. (2008), call the amount 
of CO2 released during the first 50 years of this process the “carbon debt” of land 
conversion.  Biofuels can eventually repay this debt if they have net GHG 
emissions lower than the life cycle emissions of the fossil fuels they replace.  The 
study concluded that biofuels produced in the United States, Brazil, and Southeast 
Asia would create a carbon debt releasing 17 to 420 times more CO2 than the 
annual GHG savings that they would provide by displacing fossil fuels.  It would 
take 48 years for corn ethanol produced on U.S. cropland to repay its carbon debt, 
and 93 years for corn ethanol produced on converted grasslands.  The debt 
incurred by palm oil produced in peatland rainforest in Malaysia and Indonesia 
would take over 400 years to repay.  However, waste biomass or biomass grown 
from perennials on degraded or abandoned agricultural land, incurred little or no 
carbon debt and offered immediate sustainable GHG advantages (Fargione et al. 
2008). 
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Searchinger et al. (2008) analyzed land conversion, in a similar manner to 
Fargione et al. (2008), but also recognized that biofuels cause an additional 
indirect demand for land use change.  Theoretically, the agricultural land diverted 
to create biofuels causes conversion of more natural land for displaced food crops.  
The authors calculated that a 15 billion gallon expansion of U.S. corn ethanol 
production would require 26.7 million acres of new cultivated land.  Over a 30 
year period, this would double CO2 emissions relative to fossil fuels.  
Additionally, the carbon debt from this conversion and production would take 167 
years for corn ethanol to repay.  
Therefore, given the issues with land conversion and inputs associated 
with biofuel use, in many cases restoring natural vegetation and forests provide a 
better carbon offset than clearing land for biofuel production, which is associated 
with a huge upfront carbon loss (Righelato and Spracklen 2007).   
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Figure 27.  Carbon debt and land conversion (Fargione et al. 2008). 
 
4.2.5 Competition for Water 
Competition for water is an exogenous variable for the US Federal 
Government.  Presently, it is not a major policy driver for biofuels, but it is widely 
expected to become a substantial issue in the not too distant future.  
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Koh and Ghazoul (2008), reported on a study presented by (WWAP – 
UNESCO, 2006) that observed pressure on water resources is increasing globally 
due to population growth, rural-to-urban and trans boundary migrations, climate 
change, natural disasters, poverty, and warfare.  The water crisis is exacerbated in 
developing countries, where there is a dearth of clean water and sanitation 
commonly resulting in malnutrition, disease, and death (Pickett et al. 2008).   
Water is also a critical part of biofuel production.  It is required in both the 
production of feedstock and the conversion of biomass to fuel (Boddiger 2007, 
Charles et al. 2007, de Fraiture et al. 2008, Koh and Ghazoul 2008, Sexton et al. 
2009, Tilman et al. 2009).  The need for irrigation and the amount varies based on 
the crop type and local climate.  Sexton et al. (2009), reported on a study 
conducted by Serageldin (2001), that placed the average water consumption for 
corn feedstocks at 1,527 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol produced (Figure 
29).  This value was compared with the 1,320 gallons of water required to 
produce the daily food requirements for an average diet in North America 
(Serageldin 2001, Sexton et al. 2009).  Further work conducted by Pate et al. 
(2007) and Phillips et al. (2007), and reported by Koh and Ghazoul (2008), 
estimated that biorefineries consume 4 gallons of process water per gallon of 
bioethanol produced (gal/gal).  It was thought that the losses occurred from 
evaporation during the distillation of ethanol following fermentation.  Water use 
associated with petroleum refining was reported at 1.5 gal/gal by Pate et al., 2007 
(Koh and Ghazoul 2008).   
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Sexton et al. (2009), also cited a report by Fingerman and Torn (2008), 
that claimed, by some estimates, the water consumed by feedstock crops through 
evapotranspiration, could by 2110 meet or exceed the total water used for 
evapotranspiration by all global croplands in 2002.  Chemical contamination 
could also be an emergent issue.  As prices for agricultural products rise due to 
biomass demand and production, farmers will find it worthwhile to add more 
chemicals to their crops.  Increased chemical usage would likely result in 
increased pollution of water resources from farm runoff and groundwater 
percolation (Figure 28) (Sexton et al. 2009).  Additionally, the water used is often 
derived from aquifers that may not continue to provide water indefinitely (Patzek 
et al. 2005).  
 
 
Figure 28.  Water use in biofuel production (Sexton et al. 2009). 
 
112 
 
 
Figure 29.  Water embedded in biofuel for four feedstocks.  High-yield biomass = second-
generation biofuels (Sexton et al. 2009). 
 
In a case study, de Fraiture et al. (2008), noted that China and India, two 
of the world‟s largest agricultural producers and consumers, already are severely 
limited in water availability.  However, both countries have initiated programs to 
increase biofuel production (de Fraiture et al. 2008).  Due to water limitations, 
China has implemented a costly project to bring water from the south to north by 
diverting water from the Yangtze River to the Yellow River basin.  India is 
considering a similar multibillion dollar project that would create inter-basin 
water transfers (de Fraiture et al. 2008). 
From these considerations, it is clear that adoption of bioenergy on a large 
scale should only be attempted in conjunction with a full understanding of the 
bioenergy system, how it integrates with other industrial sectors, and how it 
impacts on the environment.  Factors to consider in the energy life cycle analysis 
include: farming equipment, cultivation practices (tillage increases carbon loss), 
inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides, water use, 
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harvesting, and transportation of feedstock and biofuel.  Thus, large scale 
bioenergy production will be a large perturbation on many linked systems, and 
will need a full systems approach to be properly evaluated for benefits and for 
costs. 
4.3 Biofuel Case Studies  
4.3.1 Sugarcane in Brazil  
Ethanol production in Brazil and biodiesel production in Malaysia 
illuminate the issues associated with land clearing for feedstock agriculture.   
Presently, Brazil is by far the largest sugar cane producer in the world 
where cane is used to produce sugar, falernum (sugary syrup added to drinks), 
rum, cachaca (Brazilian alcoholic beverage), and ethanol.  The bagasse (remains 
of crushed sugar cane) and crop residue may be used to provide heat energy in the 
mill and electricity to the consumer electricity grid.    
Marris (2006), reported on a study conducted by Isaias de Carvalho 
Macedo at the University of Campinas in Brazil.  His study considered all the 
agricultural and processing inputs of sugar cane ethanol production.  Macedo and 
his colleagues estimated that the whole well-to-wheels process cost 250,000 
kilojoules per tonne of cane.  Each tonne of cane would then produce roughly two 
million kilojoules of ethanol and surplus energy from bagasse.  This equals 
roughly an eight fold return.  Additionally, the analysis suggested that one ton of 
cane used as ethanol represents a CO2 emissions net avoidance of 220.5 kilograms 
when compared to gasoline of the same energy content.  Macedo extrapolated that 
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Brazilian ethanol use reduces GHG emissions by 25.8 million tons of CO2 
equivalent per year.  The US Department of Energy reported that Brazil‟s total 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are 92 million tons a year.  Thus, 25.8 million 
represent a significant emission reduction.  Brazilian sugar cane ethanol is also 
presently the cheapest to produce at 25 cents per liter.  Marris (2006), also 
reported that annual yield was 5,300 – 6,500 liters/hectare with a green house gas 
savings of 87- 96% when compared to gasoline.  Fulton et al. (2004),  performed 
an analysis of the energy balance of sugar cane to ethanol in Brazil that showed 
the process of converting sugar cane to ethanol has improved substantially in 
recent years.   
Table 13 analyzes data collected in studies by Macedo.  The table includes 
all energy expended from crop production (including fertilizer production), 
transport, conversion to ethanol, and energy spent on equipment construction and 
conversion plants.  The table does not include renewable energy expended, it only 
shows fossil energy expended.  The net energy balance was found by dividing 
energy output by fossil energy input.  It was determined to be approximately 8 on 
average and 10 at best.  Therefore, for every unit of ethanol produced, about 0.1 
units of fossil energy were required.  In comparison, Fulton et al (2004), indicated 
0.6 to 0.8 units of fossil energy are required to produce one unit of grain ethanol 
in the U.S. or Europe.  The Brazilian climate reduces the need for large crop 
inputs due to the regions natural rainfall, intense sunlight, and productive soil.   
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Table 13.  Energy balance of sugar cane to ethanol in Brazil (Fulton et al. 2004). 
  Energy Requirement (MJ/tonne of processed cane) 
 Average Best  values 
Sugar cane production 202 192 
  Agricultural operations 38 38 
  Cane transportation 43 36 
  Fertilizers 66 63 
  Lime, herbicides, etc. 19 19 
  Seeds 6 6 
  Equipment 29 29 
Ethanol Production 49 40 
  Electricity 0 0 
  Chemicals and Lubricants 6 6 
  Buildings 12 9 
  Equipment 31 24 
Total energy input 251 232 
Energy output 2089 2367 
  Ethanol 1921 2051 
  Bagasse surplus 169 316 
Net energy balance (out/in)  8.3 10.2 
 
Additionally, due to excess production of bagasse energy, the plant‟s 
conversion process energy derived from fossil fuels can be reduced to zero or 
nearly zero.  The study also noted, that 2002 annual sugar cane harvest yield was 
about 68.7 tonnes per hectare.  That is roughly 6,200 liters per hectare per year.  
Fulton et al (2004), estimated that this value will likely become the average 
productivity over the next 5 to 10 years.  Finally, recent regulations banned the 
burning of dry residual biomass left in the field.  In the future the residual biomass 
will be added to the bagasse used for energy production.    
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As attractive as the ethanol fuel industry from sugarcane has been, there 
are concerns.  The greatest concern is fear that along with its expansion natural 
forests will be converted to agricultural land, either directly through conversion to 
sugarcane fields or by displacing food agriculture and ranching to untouched 
landscapes, like the Brazilian Cerrado (grasslands).  This would lead to large scale 
biodiversity loss and significant releases of stored carbon.  However, the Brazilian 
pro-sugarcane ethanol  industry argues that Brazil is large enough to 
accommodate sugar cane expansion without displacing food agriculture or 
coming anywhere near the rainforest.  They argue the limiting factor will be 
capital rather than land (Marris 2006).   
4.3.2 Palm Oil in Malaysia 
Palm oil is an edible vegetable oil and another common biodiesel 
feedstock derived from the fruit of the oil palm.  The oil palm is a tree found in 
humid tropical environments such as Malaysia, with an annual rainfall of 1800 to 
5000 mm evenly distributed throughout the year.  Marris (2006), estimated that 
the oil palm can produce an annual biofuel yield of 5,000-6,000 liters/hectare.  
The tree is slow to mature and takes roughly three years before it produces fruit 
but continues to be a viable producer for approximately 25 years.  The fruit 
resembles avocados and grows in bunches, which are typically harvested by hand.  
Trees generally are planted at a density of 150 trees/hectare.  The DOE (2006), 
reported that, once mature, oil palms can produce up to 10.6 metric tonnes of oil 
per hectare annually.  However, the average is approximately half this value.   
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Palm oil is Malaysia‟s largest agricultural product, and is now the top 
selling vegetable oil in the world (Stone 2007).  Malaysia presently is the largest 
producer of palm oil with about 13.4 billion pounds of mesocarp oil and 3.5 
billion pounds of kernel oil produced from about 3.8 million hectares of land 
(DOE 2006).  Palm oil is converted to biodiesel in a relatively straight forward 
process.  Thus, the industry has and is expected to expand significantly.   
However, expansion has come at a cost.  Widespread reports claim that 
tropical forests have been and continue to be cleared for palm oil plantations.  
NGOs report that not only is critical habitat for numerous species of birds, 
mammals, and bats (Stone 2007) being destroyed, but also deforestation for 
biofuel monoculture releases carbon contributing to global warming (Righelato 
and Spracklen 2007).  Additionally, the UN Development Programme recently 
reported that logging and forest clearing is endangering the way of life for local 
indigenous populations.  
4.4 Second Generation Biofuels  
Due to the significant issues associated with first generation biofuels, 
greater focus and political pressure has emerged to commercially develop second 
generation biofuels.  In addition, without subsidies first generation biofuels are 
not cost competitive with petroleum.  First generation issues are significant and 
attracted the attention of several of the action arenas directly or indirectly, but for 
the action arenas in this study they were just another set of issues.  For the US 
Federal Government, they sat alongside of rural incomes, and agribusiness 
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priorities in the decision making process.  With the UNFCCC, fuel versus food, 
land use change, and the actual energy and emissions concerns were of interest. 
However, the process of reaching international agreement was not driven 
substantially by these first generation considerations for biofuels.  They were 
second tier issues.  Nevertheless, it was important that Congress, in the Energy 
Act 2007, mandated that new technology begin to augment corn based ethanol for 
biofuel.  The US Federal Government, has in addition, allocated research funds to 
explore better fuels and the technologies to produce them.  Unfortunately, in the 
eyes of many, the amount of funding is too small to significantly alter the current 
situation in the near term.  As I will show in the final chapters of this thesis, the 
dominate biofuel in the US, is likely set to remain corn ethanol for at least another 
decade.  
Second generation technologies promise significant improvements over 
first generation technologies.  The non-comestible feedstocks (like hardy grasses, 
wood, agricultural residue, natural waste, and algae) are potentially more 
affordable and don‟t compete directly with the food supply.  Second generation 
biofuels are, as reported by Deurwaarder (2005), all around more earth friendly.  
However, the challenge for second generation technologies is to reach their 
promise.  Thus, the dilemma with second generation lignocellulosic technology is 
accessing the sugars locked into strong lignin and cellulosic bonds.  Present 
methods of release of fermentable sugars include enzymes, chemical hydrolysis 
(acid treatment), steam heating, and other pre-treatments.  After the sugars are 
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freed they can be fermented and processed the same as first generation 
technology, but none of these technologies are fully satisfactory.  In what follows, 
I will discuss three examples of second generation biofuel technologies; two 
involve new feedstocks.  They are lignocellulosic and algae feedstocks.  The third 
is a new energy molecule – butanol. 
4.4.1 New Feedstocks 
New feedstocks are an important direction for biofuels.  Crops providing 
most present day feedstock have been optimized for producing feed and food 
grains and oils on quality farmland, not for producing fuel on marginal land.  
Little has been done to optimize these feedstocks for fuel production, and of 
course, food crops may not even be the best for producing fuels.  Many believe 
that there is great opportunity to optimize for both new feedstocks and new fuel 
molecules.  This is almost certainly true for lignocellulosic technology which 
when fully developed may use agricultural waste products, but more likely will 
use grasses and woody plants designed specifically to be converted to fuel.  Oil 
yielding plants are likely to go the same way. 
Another line of exploration is conversion technology and the energy 
molecule itself.  Bioethanol requires sugars or starches for traditional production, 
and biodiesel requires triglycerides, but much of biomass comes in the form of 
lignocelluloses, or in the case of microorganisms, carbohydrates and proteins.  
Agricultural waste such as corn stover, grasses, and woody plants are all rich in 
cellulose.  Today this biomass can only be used for fuels by direct combustion or 
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by anaerobic digestion to biogas.  Much research is now directed toward releasing 
cellulose and converting it to sugars that can be used for bioethanol or other 
energy molecules (Cardona and Sanchez 2007, Solomon et al. 2007).   
Success in conversion technology research opens up the possibility of 
using perennial grasses, such as switch grass and miscanthus.  The DOE (2006), 
noted that these crops are more agriculturally efficient requiring fewer inputs and 
add greater benefit to the land ecologically.  Less fertilizer is required for these 
perennial crops.  This is partially due to perennial root systems which are long 
lived and form interactions with root symbiants which facilitate acquisition of 
mineral nutrients.  By requiring smaller amounts of fertilizer, run off for 
perennials is much lower than for corn and other grain crops.  Additionally, 
perennials better retain mineral nutrients, improve soil quality and decrease soil 
erosion due to the soil stabilizing capability of the roots.  Perennials also have 
higher annual solar energy conversion efficiency than annuals.  DOE (2006), 
reported on studies by S. Long at the University of Illinois, perennials were found 
to establish a photosynthetically active canopy more quickly in the spring that 
may also persist longer into the fall.  The study noted that perennials in temperate 
zones may have substantially greater total biomass yields per unit land area than 
annuals.  Reduced tillage, once the crop is established, may also increase soil 
carbon levels thus sequestering atmospheric carbon into the soil.    
Further lines of exploration that may create a more advantageous outcome 
would be to identify ideal feedstock plants.  Plants used for food have been 
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designed over many years, millennia in some cases, for food – not fuel.  An 
“ideal” plant may have some of the characteristics in Table 14 below.   
 
Table 14.  Attributes of an “Ideal” biomass crop. (DOE 2006) 
The "Ideal" Biomass Crop? Corn 
Short-Rotation 
Coppice
*
 Perennial Grass 
C4 photosynthesis *   * 
Long canopy duration   * * 
Recycles nutrients to roots     * 
Clean burning     * 
Low input   * * 
Sterile (noninvasive) N/A (*) M.g.
**
 
Winter standing   * * 
Easily removed *   * 
High water-use efficiency     * 
No known pests or diseases     M.g. 
Uses existing farm equipment *   * 
* Coppice is a grove of densely growing small trees pruned to encourage growth; 
** 
Miscanthus 
giganteus. 
 
Perennial grasses, such as switch grass and miscanthus, are considered 
advantageous for a number of reasons.  First, they have all the qualities of 
perennials noted above.  Shubert (2006) and Sanderson (2006), reported that 
miscanthus (elephant grass) can create an annual yield of 7,300 litres/ha of biofuel 
and a GHG savings in the range of 37% to 73% (most were in the range of 65% - 
70%) versus gasoline.  They also indicated that switchgrass can create an annual 
yield of 3,100 to 7,600 litres/ha of biofuel and, like miscanthus, a GHG savings in 
the range of 37% to 73% (most were in the range of 65% - 70%) versus gasoline.  
David Tilman of the University of Minnesota (Tilman 2006) encourages planting 
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a mixture of prairie grasses.  Based on his experimental plots, low input and high 
diversity grasses are more resistant to drought and pests than farmed 
monocultures, and on average yield 2.7 times as much biomass than even the 
highly regarded switchgrass.   
Rosillo-Calle (2007), described some of the advantageous qualities of 
switchgrass.  It is a C4 grass, a good source of energy, excellent cover for 
wildlife, and prevents soil erosion.  Switchgrass is long lived and can produce 
high yields on marginal soils at low starting costs.  It also is a low input crop, cold 
tolerant, and can adapt to a wide variety a agroecosystems.  The DOE (2006), 
reported on a switchgrass study done by K. Vogel of the University of Nebraska 
involving a 5 year old switchgrass field in Northeast South Dakota in 2005.  They 
noted that each 1200 lb bale could create 48 gallons of ethanol at a conversion 
rate of 80 gallons per ton.  The field had a potential of 5 to 6 tons per acre or 400 
to 500 gallons of ethanol per acre, as this cultivar was bred as pasture grass.  
Experimentally, 10 tons per acre have been achieved, with processing goals at 100 
gallons per ton of biomass, or an ethanol yield of 1000 gallons per acre. 
4.4.2 Algae and Other Microorganisms 
There is much interest in and promise for algae and bacteria. These 
photosynthetic microorganisms are promising because they can be engineered to 
produce very high levels of lipid (precursor to biofuel).  They can, in theory, 
consume post combustion carbon dioxide from power plants and clean waste 
water from sewage plants or contaminated waters with high concentrations of 
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nitrate or phosphate.  With suitable reactor designs they could in principle even 
grow on desert land.  Using microorganisms for fuel production is not a new idea.  
The challenge has been the reactor design which needs to be inexpensive and 
rugged to withstand difficult environments.  Low-cost, race-way ponds have 
experienced difficulties with contamination by organisms with poor fuel 
production characteristics and water loss through evaporation.  In contrast, 
standard bioreactors which can maintain relatively pure cultures can be very 
expensive.   
Photosynthetic microorganisms are promising because they can be 
engineered to produce very high levels of lipid (precursor to biodiesel).  They can 
in theory, consume post combustion carbon dioxide from power plants and waste 
water from sewage plants or contaminated waters with high concentrations of 
nitrate or phosphate.  Due to algae‟s rapid growth rates, which exceed plant-based 
feedstock, it may become the most viable crop to address the world‟s motor fuel 
needs.  Ledford (2006), reported that annual algae yields range from 10,000 to 
12,000 litres per hectare, and create significant GHG savings.  Algae out-produce 
all other biofuel feedstocks per hectare.  In comparison Marris (2006) reported 
that palm oil produces 5,000 – 6,000 litres of biodiesel/hectare, sugar cane 
produces 5,300 to 6,500 litres of ethanol/hectare, corn ears produce 3,100 to 3,900 
litres of ethanol/hectare, and Miscanthus, given cellulosic technology, can 
produce 7,300 litres of ethanol/hectare (Sanderson 2006).  The lipid is also a 
higher energy density molecule giving an added advantage of algae over ethanol 
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feedstock crops.  See Table 15, for a comparative analysis of other biofuel 
feedstock crops.  
Conversion of algae oil into biodiesel is the same as for oils from land 
crops.  The greater concern is in finding algae strains with a high lipid content and 
a fast growth rate that is easy to harvest, and finding a cost effective bioreactor 
suited for cultivation.  Other microorganisms such as diatoms and cyanobacteria 
which are capable of photosynthesis yet are smaller than 2mm in diameter, have 
become a focal point in research for mass production.  Their appeal is due to their 
less complex genetic structure which makes them easier to manipulate, fast 
growth rate, and high oil content in some species.   
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Table 15.  Preliminary assessment of biomass feedstocks (UN 2007). 
Crop Type Crop Requirements 
 Soil Water Nutrients Climate 
Cereal  less disruption of 
soil; very constant 
yield; humus 
balance is 
negatively 
influenced by 
annual removal of 
straw 
_ medium moderate 
Hemp deep soil with 
good water 
supply, pH 
balance between 6 
and 7 
some moisture 
the entire season  
moderate, no 
pesticide needed 
varied 
environmental 
conditions, 
preferably 
warmer climates 
Jatropha undemanding, 
does not require 
tillage 
can be cultivated 
under both 
irrigated and 
rain-fed 
conditions 
adapted to low 
fertility sites and 
alkaline soils, but 
better yield can be 
achieved if 
fertilizers are used 
tropical and 
subtropical but 
also arid and 
semiarid 
Maize soil should be 
well-aerated and 
well-drained  
efficient user of 
water  
require high fertility 
and should be 
maintained 
continuously 
temperate to 
tropic conditions 
Miscanthus good water 
supply, brown 
soils with high 
humus 
percentage, 
optimum pH 
between 5.5 and 
7.5 
crucial during 
the main 
growing seasons 
low adapted to 
warmer climates 
but fairly cold-
tolerant 
Oil Palm good drainage; pH 
between 4 and 7; 
soil flat, rich, and 
deep 
even distribution 
of rainfall 
between 1,800 
and 5,000 
throughout the 
year 
low tropical and 
subtropical 
climate with 
temperature 
requirement of 
25-32 Celsius 
Poplar deep, moist soil, 
medium texture, 
and high flood 
tolerance 
high; irrigation 
may be needed 
high artic to temperate 
Potato deep, well 
drained, friable, 
well-aerated, 
high; irrigation 
required 
high fertilizer 
demand 
optimum 
temperature of 
18-20 Celsius 
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porous, pH 
between 5 and 6 
Rapeseed mild, deep loamy, 
medium texture, 
well-drained 
600 mm 
minimum yearly 
precipitation  
similar to wheat sensitive to high 
temperatures, 
grow best 
between 15 and 
20 Celsius 
Rice needs permeable 
layer and good 
drainage 
very high, grown 
in flooded fields 
relatively high input 
of fertilizers, very 
intensive systems 
constant 
temperatures, 
grow best 
between 15 and 
20 Celsius 
Sorghum light-to-medium 
textured soils, 
well-aerated, 
well-drained, and 
relatively tolerant 
to short periods of 
water logging 
shows a high 
degree of 
flexibility 
towards depth 
and frequency of 
water supply 
because of 
drought 
resistance 
characteristics 
very high nitrogen 
feeding crop 
optimum 
temperatures for 
high producing 
varieties are over 
25 Celsius 
Soybean moist alluvial 
soils with good 
organic content, 
high water 
capacity, good 
structure, loose 
soil 
High optimum soil pH of 
6 to 6.5 
tropical, 
subtropical, and 
temperate 
climates 
Sugarbeet medium-to-
slightly heavy 
texture, well-
drained, tolerant 
to salinity 
moderate, in the 
range of 550 to 
750 mm/growing 
period 
adequate nitrogen is 
required to ensure 
early maximum 
vegetative growth, 
high fertilizer 
demand 
variety of 
temperate 
climates 
Sugarcane does not require a 
special soil type, 
but preferable 
well-aerated with 
a total available 
water content of 
15% or more 
high and evenly 
distributed 
through the 
growing season 
high nitrogen and 
potassium needs but 
at maturity, the 
nitrogen content of 
the soil must be as 
low as possible for a 
good sugar recovery 
tropical or 
subtropical 
climate 
Sunflower grown under rain-
fed conditions on 
a wide range of 
soils 
varies from 600 
to 1,000 mm, 
depending on 
climate and 
length of total 
growing period 
moderate  climates ranging 
from arid under 
irrigation to 
temperate under 
rain-fed 
conditions 
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Switchgrass ranging from 
prairies to arid to 
marsh 
drought-resistant 
and very-
efficient water 
use 
low warm-season 
plant 
Wheat medium textures High high temperate 
climates, in the 
subtropics with 
winter rainfall, in 
the tropics near 
the equator, in 
the highland with 
altitudes of more 
than 1,500m, and 
in the tropics 
away from the 
Equator where 
the rainy season 
is long and 
where the crop is 
grown as a 
winter crop 
Willow sandy, clay, and 
silt loams 
substantial 
quantities of 
water 
significant nutrient 
uptake 
can tolerate very 
low temperatures 
in winter, but 
frost in late 
spring or early 
autumn will 
damage the top 
shoots 
 
4.4.3 New Energy Molecule – Butanol 
Biobutanol is poised as a better molecule to replace ethanol as a substitute 
for gasoline fuels.  It can be produced from the same biomass feedstock as 
ethanol, and like ethanol, it can be produced fermentatively or petrochemically 
(Durre 2007).  Cascone (2008), outlined the advantages of butanol over ethanol:   
• Butanol is easily incorporated into and used in existing petroleum 
infrastructure, including pipeline transportation. 
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• Butanol avoids the need for plant restructuring and operational 
changes as it can be blended, at any ratio, into gasoline or diesel at 
existing refineries. 
• Butanol does not absorb sludge or water, nor does it dissolve rust and 
undesirable materials in pipelines, tanks, and equipment.  
• Butanol‟s octane values and energy density approach gasoline's. Thus, 
vehicle fuel economy (mpg) will not significantly degrade as seen in 
gasoline-ethanol blends.  
• Butanol has a much lower vapor pressure than ethanol. Therefore, it 
will not raise the fuels Reid vapor pressure permitting the use of lower 
cost octane enhancers like butane (high vapor pressure) in butanol-
gasoline blends in warm seasons. Reid vapor pressure is a measure of 
fuel volatility.  The desired measure is dependent upon ambient 
temperature. Cold climates may result in too little volatility and an 
inability of the car to start.  Overly hot climates can result in excess 
volatility, where the liquid fuel changes to a gaseous fuel, rendering a 
fuel pump ineffective and depriving the engine of fuel.  
• The low solubility of butanol in water, and water in butanol, lessons 
the risk for spills to spread into groundwater.  
• Butanol, like other alcohols, is largely biodegradable thereby limiting 
environmental impacts in the event of a spill or leak.  
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Cascone (2008) compared the properties of n-butanol, ethanol, and 
gasoline, and showed that the properties that make butanol superior to ethanol are 
the heating value, RVP, octane number, and water solubility (Table 16).  A higher 
heating value, or one that is closer to gasoline, is better.  Heating value relates 
directly to how often one would have to refill their vehicle.  It is the energy per 
liter.  Butanol has a higher heating value than ethanol, and is closer to gasoline.   
 
Table 16.  Properties of n-butanol, ethanol and gasoline (Cascone 2008). 
Properties    n - Butanol Ethanol Gasoline 
Specific Gravity at 60 Fahrenheit 0.814 0.794 0.720-0.775 
Heating Value, MJ/L 26.9-27.0 21.1-21.7 32.2-32.9 
Research Octane Number (RON) 94* 106-130* 95 
Motor Octane Number (MON) 80-81* 89-103* 85 
RVP of 5% and 10% - Alcohol/Gasoline 
Blends, psi 
6.4*/6.4* 31*/20* #  
Oxygen, wt.% 21.6 34.7 <2.7 
Water Solubility at 25 Celsius, % 9.1 100 <0.01 
* Gasoline blend values of the alcohol octane numbers and vapor pressures; # For comparison, the 
summer/winter specifications for gasoline are <7.8/15 psi. 
 
 
Additionally, the octane rating of n-butanol is closer to gasoline than 
ethanol, but lower than ethanol.  The higher value for ethanol is an advantage, as 
it can be added to standard gasoline as an octane enhancer to reduce engine 
knocking, and improve energy efficiency, power and torque. The higher octane 
value is the result of higher oxygen content in the ethanol that makes the fuel burn 
cleaner..  
RVP is the Reid Vapor Pressure.  It is measured in pounds per square inch 
(psi), and is a measure of the volatility of a fuel.  The lower the pressure, the 
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lower the volatility, and consequently  evaporative emissions and air pollution.  
Butanol has a lower RVP than ethanol, and  is better than ethanol in this regard.   
Water solubility is a serious issue with ethanol, as mentioned above.  
Solubility and the hygroscopic properties of ethanol complicate transportation and 
storage logistics.  Ethanol is very water soluble unlike gasoline.  Butanol has a 
very low water solubility, and is less likely to pick up impurities or to cause phase 
separation.  
 
 
Figure 30.  Process for production of biobutanol (Cascone 2008). 
 
Biobutanol can use the same feedstocks as ethanol (cellulose, corn, wheat, 
sugarbeat, sorghum, cassava, and sugarcane) (Durre 2007, Cascone 2008).  It is 
produced by a number of methods, including fermentation and thermochemical 
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routes (Figure 30).  Current production primarily utilizes acetone-butanol-ethanol 
(ABE) fermentation, which uses the bacterium Clostridium acetobutylicum (or 
Weizmann organism) (Cascone 2008).  Products from this process also include 
H2, acetic acid, lactic acid and propionic acid. 
As I indicated at the outset of this chapter, it is well recognized by those 
familiar with first generation biofuels that the associated problems are significant 
and need to be addressed.  But there are no action arenas for these issues.  They 
become context (exogenous variables) for arenas that do drive policy.  These 
issues are not central yet to policy making considerations.  They are secondary to 
the larger issues like farming income, energy prices, energy security, and supply 
and demand, to name a few.  Nevertheless, global support for research has 
brought many of the concerns into better focus. The hope is, that through 
research, crops and farming methods can be found that will require fewer inputs, 
make productive use of marginal lands, and not create competition with food. 
Case studies presented in this chapter help illuminate real world examples 
of these issues.  Second generation biofuels would avoid the difficulties described 
in this chapter.  To the extent these new biofuels are considered by action arenas, 
they are viewed favorably.  For example, the US government is supporting a 
variety of research for cellulosic technologies as well as algae and other nonfood 
oil products.  From a policy perspective, it is important that this research is 
supported especially by the US Federal Government as the technologies are too 
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early stage for businesses to seriously consider.  Without policy support, second 
generation fuels will not happen in a meaningful time frame. 
  
133 
 
CHAPTER 5 
FUTURE OF BIOFUELS AND ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapter I have shown how the IAD framework can be used to 
understand the policy history of biofuels and especially corn based bioethanol.  
The shape of the biofuel industry in the United States is explained by actions 
within five action arenas.  I will now discuss how this same framework can be 
used to reflect on the future.  Specifically, I will address my third question: what 
is the future for biofuels in the United States, and how is it related to energy 
sustainability? 
Thus far, the action arenas do not coordinate their efforts.  Outcomes from 
one serve as inputs to the others, but each has its own primary drivers that are not 
explicitly about biofuels.  In the absence of coordination, the future of biofuels 
will depend on a suite of factors, some of which are important to biofuels, and 
some that are not.  This being the situation, I consider two limiting cases for how 
the future of biofuels might unfold, a business-as-usual scenario and an approach 
focused on sustainable biofuel use.  
In the business-as-usual scenario, ones assumes that the fairly loose 
connection between action arenas, seen thus far, continues into the future.  Given 
there is no trajectory change in the action arenas, one might expect that the past is 
a reasonable guide for the future.  This business-as-usual case is similar to the 
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assumptions made by the EIA while producing energy outlooks.  The most recent 
projections provided by the EIA in the Energy Outlook for 2009 and 2010 will be 
explored below as a business as usual projection.   
5.2 U.S. Biofuel Projections 
Every year the EIA Annual Energy Outlook prepares projections of energy 
supply and demand for the United States.  These projections typically have a 25 
year or more time horizon.  The EIA created projections for total bioenergy, 
ethanol, biodiesel, wood and other biomass, and biogenic municipal waste.  
Biomass consumption increases by 4.4% per year on average from 2007 to 2030 
and makes up 22% of total marketed renewable energy consumption in 2030, 
compared with 10% in 2007 (EIA 2009a).  Figure 31, illustrates the rise in total 
biofuel percentage in the total energy mix.  In 2006, one sees the total biofuel 
percentage in US total energy consumption, beginning at 0.8% and reaching 3.6 
% by 2030.  In energy units this approximately is 0.8 quadrillion Btu of biofuels 
per year in 2006 out of a total US energy consumption of 100 quadrillion Btu.  In 
2030, those values increase to 4 quadrillion Btu of biofuels and 114 quadrillion 
Btu total energy consumption.  
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Figure 31.  Projections for percent biofuels in total U.S. energy mix.   Original units are in 
quadrillion Btu per year. Includes data for heat, co-products, and ethanol consumption from motor 
gasoline and E85 (adapted from (EIA 2009a). 
 
 
Figure 32.  Projections for renewable energy generation from biogenic municipal waste and wood 
and other biomass.  Units are in quadrillion Btu (adapted from (EIA 2009a). 
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Figure 32. shows the amount of energy derived from biogenic municipal 
waste and wood and other biomass.  Wood and other biomass, are the primary 
source of energy production.  Biogenic municipal waste begins at 0.2 quadrillion 
Btu in 2006 and flat lines at approximately 0.3 quadrillion Btu in 2015.  Wood 
and other biomass begin as a lesser source of energy in 2006 at 0.08 quadrillion 
Btu but by 2010 it surpasses biogenic municipal waste with 0.35 quadrillion Btu 
versus 0.26 quadrillion Btu for municipal solid waste.  EIA projections have wood 
and other biomass peak at 1.5 quadrillion Btu in 2028 and fall slightly to 1.4 
quadrillion Btu in 2029 and stay essentially flat to 2030.  
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Figure 33.  Projections of total ethanol use versus RFS mandates (adapted from (EIA 2009a). 
 
In 2006, the EIA‟s projection for total ethanol production began at 6.20 
billion gallons/year. In 2008 the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) for conventional 
ethanol (seen in RFS total ethanol – Figure 33) required a volume of 9.0 billion 
gallons/year, which was below the actual ethanol production at that time of 9.87 
billion gallons/year (EIA 2009a).  In 2010, the RFS also began mandating a 
volume of 0.1 billion gallons/year of cellulosic ethanol. The RFS is presently not 
extended beyond 2022.  The 2022 RFS for conventional ethanol is 15 billion 
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gallons/year, RFS for cellulosic ethanol is 16 billion gallons/year and the RFS 
total is 36 billion gallons/year.  However, the EIA projections for 2022 for actual 
ethanol production are about 26 billion gallons/year.  However, EIA projections 
continue to 2030 where production reaches 32.5 billion gallons/year.  
Growth drivers affecting the future of biofuel use include, the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, RFS mandates, production tax 
credits, and future lines of research. 
The Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) was first established in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005.  It was later expanded in the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007.  EISA 2007, was signed into law on December 19, 2007 
and took effect in January 1, 2009.  Under the EISA, the Renewable Fuel 
Standards (RFS) created greater volumetric mandates for biofuel production 
which requires 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 and 36 billion gallons by 2022 (Table 
17).  The RFS also required a minimum quantity to be derived from advanced 
biofuels, cellulosic biofuels and biodiesel.  The table that follows summarizes the 
2007 RFS mandates:  
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Table 17.  EISA renewable fuels standards (110th U.S. Congress 2007). 
 Year  Biofuel production (In billions of gallons) 
 
Conventio
nal biofuel 
Advanced 
biofuel 
Cellulosic 
biofuel 
Biomass 
based 
diesel 
Undifferent
iated 
advanced 
biofuel 
Total RFS 
2008 9.00 - - -   9.00 
2009 10.50 0.60 - 0.50 0.10 11.10 
2010 12.00 0.95 0.10 0.65 0.20 12.95 
2011 12.60 1.35 0.25 0.80 0.30 13.95 
2012 13.20 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 15.20 
2013 13.80 2.75 1.00 * 1.75 16.55 
2014 14.40 3.75 1.75 * 2.00 18.15 
2015 15.00 5.50 3.00 * 2.50 20.50 
2016 15.00 7.25 4.25 * 3.00 22.25 
2017 15.00 9.00 5.50 * 3.50 24.00 
2018 15.00 11.00 7.00 * 4.00 26.00 
2019 15.00 13.00 8.50 * 4.50 28.00 
2020 15.00 15.00 10.50 * 4.50 30.00 
2021 15.00 18.00 13.50 * 4.50 33.00 
2022 15.00 21.00 16.00 * 5.00 36.00 
* At least 1.00 (specific amount to be determined by the administrator) 
 
The Energy Independence and Security Act defines conventional biofuels 
as ethanol derived from corn starch that meets at least a 20% reduction in 
lifecycle GHG emissions compared to baseline lifecycle GHG emissions.  
Advanced biofuels are renewable fuels not derived from corn starch.  This is a 
large category that includes ethanol derived from cellulose or lignin, non-corn 
derived sugar and starch, and waste material; biomass-based diesel; biogas 
derived from renewable biomass; butanol and other alcohols derived from 
renewable biomass; and fuels derived from cellulosic biomass.  To be categorized 
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as an advanced biofuel, the production of the fuel must achieve lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions of at least 50% below baseline emissions.  Cellulosic 
ethanol is derived from cellulose and lignin harvested from renewable biomass 
crops.  It must achieve at least a 60% reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions 
compared to baseline lifecycle GHG emissions.  Biomass-based biodiesel, 
(defined by the EPA) is produced from nonpetroleum renewable resources and 
meets the registration requirements for fuels and fuel additives.  It has at least a 
50% reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions compared to baseline emissions.  
Undifferentiated advanced biofuels include cellulosic biofuels, biomass-based 
diesel, and co-processed renewable diesel.  It does not include corn ethanol, and it 
has at least a 50% reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions compared to baseline 
lifecycle GHG emissions.  The term baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions 
refers to the average lifecycle GHG emissions for gasoline or diesel used in 
transport in 2005. 
EISA 2007, promotes research and development for biofuels.  It promotes 
research to expand biodiesel and biogas use as motor fuels; authorizes grants for 
R&D and commercial applications for cellulosic biofuel technology; promotes the 
conversion of corn-based ethanol plants to the production of cellulosic biofuels; 
explores the feasibility of algae for biofuel production; and promotes university 
based biofuel R&D. 
Production tax credits (PTC) provided the support for companies to invest 
in renewable fuels by permitting them to write off renewable investment against 
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other investments they made.  In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009, President Obama extended the use of PTC.  The use of this policy tool 
has been instrumental in the growth of the renewable energy sector.  Companies 
that generate closed-loop bioenergy (using dedicated energy crops) can receive a 
PTC of 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour benefit in the first ten years of the renewable 
facilities operation.  Companies using “open loop” biomass, like farm and forest 
wastes, can receive a PTC of 1 cent per kilowatt-hour.  
In the absence of new policy, EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2009 has 
projected U.S. energy related carbon dioxide emissions will grow 8.7% by 2030.  
U.S. Carbon dioxide emissions for 2008 were 5.8 billion metric tons and by 2030 
emissions are projected to reach 6.3 billion metric tons.  This is an annual growth 
rate of 0.3%.  Carbon dioxide dominates in the percentage of GHG emissions, but 
EIA expects other greenhouse gases to follow the same pattern.  A 0.3% annual 
GHG emissions growth rate is a decline from 20 years ago, when the rate of 
increase was 0.7%.  However, 0.3% falls far short of Obama‟s pledge to reduce 
GHG to roughly 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.  
The EIA‟s early release of the Annual Energy Outlook 2010, projects 
petroleum demand will remain nearly constant and reliance on imported liquid 
fuels will decrease significantly over the next 25 years.  Biofuels are projected to 
make up for this increase demand in liquid fuels.  However, the report also 
projects that biofuels will not reach the 2022 Renewable Fuel Standard of 36 
billion gallons.  Flex-fuel vehicles and electric vehicles are projected to dominate 
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the sales of cars and light duty trucks by 2035, thereby reaching an average light 
duty fuel efficiency of 40 miles per gallon.  These and other energy efficiency 
measures and structural changes in the U.S. economy, leads the EIA to presume 
that this will keep the overall energy growth low ,and energy consumption growth 
at only 14% in 27 years.  However, it is important to note that projections are 
based on the existing state of affairs, and excludes future policy changes like cap 
and trade and technology improvements that are not commercially viable today, 
but could improve in the future.  Richard Newell, the EIA Administrator said 
recently that the EIA‟s “projections show that existing policies that stress energy 
efficiency and alternative fuels, together with higher energy prices, curb energy 
consumption growth and shift the energy mix toward  renewable fuels.  Assuming 
no new policies [are legislated], fossil fuels would still provide about 78% of all 
the energy used in 2035.”  Presently, fossil fuels make up around 84% of 
America‟s energy (EIA 2009a).  
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Figure 34.  Biofuels displace conventional fuels in the transportation mix (EIA 2009a). 
 
Figure 34 shows that while total energy demand for gasoline type fuels 
will slightly increase to 2030, biofuels will make up for the new energy demand, 
and will also displace the usage of motor gasoline from 2007 to 2030.  The 
demand for diesel fuels is also projected to increase to 2030.  However, biodiesel 
content, while increasing, will not make up for this increase in overall diesel 
demand.  Conventional diesel fuel use will increase from 2007 to 2030.  
Sustainable biofuels were developed to address several issues, high and 
volatile petroleum prices, secure access to energy supply, reduce dependence on 
imports, economic revitalization in rural areas, climate change, and air pollution. 
They have the potential to contribute to such a future, but as the EIA projections 
show, the future or biofuels remains uncertain.   
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Thus, as we see in the case above, essentially business as usual prevails 
within the IAD.  In this future, the details regarding the role for biofuels are 
uncertain, but in any event are small.  However, if action arenas began to be more 
tightly integrated by a greater alignment of interests, the future may look very 
different.  Policy would change significantly, if for example, a climate treaty 
could be agreed upon in the UNFCCC framework, and if the DOHA round within 
the WTO was successfully completed, requiring the US to reduce agriculture 
subsidies.  New international policy would create significant pressure on the US 
Federal Government, which may result in the more rapid deployment of low 
carbon energy technologies.  The combined change in these three action arenas 
will undoubtedly influence, the other two arenas, the grain and oil markets.  In 
these futures, you could see pressures on more rapid adoption of newer biofuels, 
through more price supports, research, taxation on current energy supply, or 
demand management to mention a few.  Predictions about the future of biofuels 
are still difficult to make, but in the case that action arenas do begin to align, it is 
likely to be in favor of more rapid deployment.  Given this alignment, safe 
sustainable guidelines are necessary to ensure the successful deployment of 
biofuel technology.  In the next section, I consider how biofuels can be made 
more sustainable.  
5.2 Making Biofuels Sustainable  
Sustainable biofuels were developed to address several issues; high and 
volatile petroleum prices, secure access to energy supply, dependence on energy 
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imports, economic revitalization in rural areas, climate change, and air pollution.  
Much work has been devoted to setting conditions for sustainable biofuels. The 
DOE (2006), suggested the need for a thorough understanding of the biomass 
conversion pathway and its long term harvesting impacts on soil fertility.  They 
noted the importance of soil fertility and soil microbial communities.  The DOE 
indicated that the vital nutrients present in process residues must be returned to 
the soil.  Additionally, knowledge on the composition and population dynamics of 
soil microbial communities must be implemented in order to ensure the microbes 
contribute to sustainable soil productivity. 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2006) 
emphasized that biomass consumed for energy should be regenerated by 
reforestation or replanting.  In the absence of this practice the biomass produced 
would contribute to unsustainable forestry, or agricultural practices, or lead to the 
permanent conversion of forest and plant areas.  Under these circumstances the 
lack of biomass replacement would break the natural carbon cycle and would be 
just another unsustainable process for accessing energy.  Fritsche et al. (2006), 
also indicated the importance of clarifying land ownership, ensuring a share of 
proceeds to the workers and local community, and avoiding negative human 
health impacts. 
Palmujoki (2009), updated the status of sustainable biofuels production 
discussing international attempts, thus far, to regulate the production and trade of 
biofuels by establishing criteria, indicators, and certification schemes.  The 
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criteria and indicators were developed to clarify and establish the principles of 
sustainable biofuel development and create international norms.  Palmujoki 
(2009), identified the many participant groups and the roles they play in the global 
public domain (Table 18).  The abbreviated names all have their own standards 
that may then be used in certification schemes (van Dam et al. 2008).  
 
Table 18.  Origins, sponsors, and members in C&I schemes (Palmujoki 2009). 
Origins, sponsors, and members in C & I schemes
1
 
  Initiated by: Global origin Members 
FSC
2
 Ns North-South I, Ns, Ps,R 
ITTO
3
 Gs South Gs 
Pan European
4
 Gs North/regional Gs 
Basel criteria
5
 N/R North I, Ns, R 
Cramer criteria
6
 G North/national G, Ns 
FBOMS
7
 N South/national N 
RSB
8
 N North-South G,I,IO, Ns, Ps, R 
RSPO
9
 N North-South I, Ns,Ps, R 
RFTO
10
 G North/national G, Ns 
SBA
11
 Ns North/national G, Ns, Ps, I, R 
WWF-Biomass
12
 N North N 
1
Abbreviations: G, government; I, industry; IO, international organization; N, NGO;   P, 
producers; R, retailers; 
2
FSC International Standard (1996);
 3
ITTO (1998);
 4
Improved Pan-
European Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management (2003);
 5
The Basel Criteria for 
Responsible Soy Production (2004); 
6
Cramer Commission (2006);
 7
FBOMS; 
8
RSB - Roundtable 
of Sustainable Biofuel (2008);
 9
RSPO - Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (2007);
 10
RFTO - The 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (2006);
 11
SBA - Sustainable Biodiesel Alliance (2008); and
 
12
WWF - Biomass (2007). 
 
Van Dam et al. (2008)‟s review of initiatives on biomass recognized a 
number of different areas requiring further criteria and indicators (Figure 35) and 
identified five stakeholders and their interests in certification (Table 19).  
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Figure 35.  Areas requiring criteria and indicator development (van Dam et al. 2008). 
 
Table 19.  Stakeholder groups and interests in certification (van Dam et al. 2008). 
Stakeholders Some interests for biomass certification 
National governments 
and transnational 
organizations 
Policy instrument to promote sustainable management and sustainable 
consumption pattern;, provides information for policy making, The 
EU, one of the more powerful players for establishing international 
standards has a special role in this 
Intergovernmental 
Organizations 
The UN, FAO, and UNEP in particular, play an important (potential) 
role as a neutral forum for negotiations between all kinds of 
stakeholders (particularly countries) 
Companies (producers, 
trade, industry) 
Instrument for environmental marketing, risk management and market 
access, tool for controlling origin and quality of raw materials, 
products or services, provides information for optimization of 
production processes, allows for product differentiation 
NGOs Provides information on the impacts of products, provides 
information whether the product meets quality or technical standards, 
instrument to promote sustainable management 
International bodies 
and initiatives 
Instrument to promote sustainable management and sustainable 
consumption pattern, information for policy consultancy and 
collaboration 
 
One amongst numerous, comprehensive efforts indicative of sustainable 
biofuel standards was lead by The Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels.  They 
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describe themselves as an international initiative coordinated by the Energy 
Center at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne.  They join 
farmers, companies, non-governmental organizations, experts, governments, and 
inter-governmental agencies concerned with ensuring the sustainable production 
and processing of biofuels.  The RSB, and their union of associated parties, 
developed a set of working principles to facilitate sustainable biofuel policy and 
production.  Sixteen principles were drafted under five categories, national law, 
greenhouse gas, environmental impacts, social impacts, and traceability 
(Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 2007): 
I.  National Law 
1. Local and national laws, labor laws, and land and water rights must govern 
biomass production.  Where this legislation is non-existent, international 
norm‟s should be used in substitute. 
II. Greenhouse Gas 
2. When analyzed by life cycle assessment, GHG emissions associated with 
biofuel use and production must be lower than the associated fossil fuel 
emissions.  This should include a wells-to-wheels measurement system, 
and both direct and indirect emissions must be included.  Sources of these 
emissions might originate from fossil energy utilized in the growing, 
transport, and processing of biofuels. Greenhouse gas emissions could also 
stem from loss of carbon in the soil from  change associated with land 
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conversion for biomass crop production.  The ultimate goal should be to 
approach zero emissions well-to-wheels (full cycle). 
III. Environmental Impacts 
3. Biomass production must not cause the destruction or degradation of areas 
of high conservation value. 
4. Food crops should not be displaced directly or indirectly by biofuel 
production. 
5. Soils should not be damaged or degraded due to biomass. 
6. Water resources should not be depleted or contaminated by biomass 
production.  
7. Biomass production should not cause air pollution.  
8. GMOs usage in biofuel production should be made transparent permitting 
buyer decision making.  Precaution should be taken given the unknown 
long term impacts of GMOs. 
9. Biomass production must not lead to crop displacement that requires 
further land conversion causing deforestation or destruction of critical 
habitat. 
IV. Social Impacts 
10. The well being of communities, workers, and rural populations should be 
increased with biomass production. 
11. Food security should not be jeopardized due to biomass production. 
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12. Issues of child labor and welfare in developing countries must be 
addressed in biomass production. 
13. The well-being and quality of life of the economically underprivileged 
should be improved with biomass production. 
14. Knowledge dissemination, cohesion and harmony with in communities 
should increase in regions of biomass productions. 
15. The production of biomass should encourage social security within the 
community as well as GHG reductions and waste recycling within all 
families. 
V. Traceability 
16. Production and its value chains should be traceable so that end users may 
discern between sustainable and unsustainable sources.  
Despite these efforts, van Dam (2008) asserted that better international 
coordination between initiatives is required.  A coordinated approach would 
improve coherence and efficiency in the development of sustainable biomass 
certification schemes and avoid excess proliferation of standards.  It will also 
create a clearer way forward in the approach to be taken.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I utilized the Ostrom Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework and addressed three core questions.  The IAD framework is a 
model that enables one to conceptualize, compare, study and make connections 
across arenas that would otherwise be distinct from each other.  By analyzing the 
interactions of these institutions one can see how dynamic interests combined to 
shape biofuel policy in the USA today.  The three core questions explored in this 
thesis are:  
 Why did first generation biofuels enjoy such extensive public and 
political support as late as 2007 and now are met with increasing 
skepticism? 
 There are calls coming from stakeholders to end support for first 
generation biofuels by governments.  What is the justification for a 
shift in policy? 
 What is the future for biofuels in the United States, and how is it 
related to energy sustainability? 
I have identified five action arenas in my analysis; three collective choice 
arenas – the Federal Government of the United States, the World Trade 
Organization and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and two operational arenas – the global oil and oil products markets and the 
global grain markets.  I have shown the role these action arenas all played in how 
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the support for bioethanol unfolded in the United States.  The emphasis on corn 
bioethanol resulted from the complex interplay between these action arenas that 
created the context for policy support from the US Federal Government from the 
1970s until the mid 2000s.  Generally speaking, changes in the action arenas all 
tended to reinforce interest in grain ethanol.  That is not to say there were no 
issues raised during the early time period.  Issues often were identified, but they 
had no action arena that made them a priority. 
It was not until 2007 – 2008 that concern about bioethanol began to come 
to the foreground, when trends in two action arenas began to cause divisions in 
what was a unified biofuel support base.  The first action arena to show concern 
was the UNFCCC, and activities related to it where biofuels in general, but 
especially bioethanol in the United States, came under heavy scrutiny for its 
secondary impacts on the environment through land use change and impact on 
water use.  Later, concern developed about the impact of corn based ethanol on 
grain markets, and the affordability of the food supply.  Once powerful action 
arenas began to be affected, pressure rose rapidly on corn based ethanol.  The 
United States Government responded partially by mandating the use of non-food 
crops for production of ethanol, but has not completely abandoned support for 
corn based bioethanol.  
The underlying tension among action arenas remains largely unresolved, 
and will likely cast a shadow over the biofuels industry until new technologies 
emerge that can balance the interests among the five action arenas and create 
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greater alignment among them.  In the absence of greater alignment the future for 
biofuel is likely to look much like the past.  Policy will largely support corn based 
bioethanol at its current level, along with modest research support for second 
generation technologies, but not at a transformation level, where government 
support for new technologies, and the infrastructure to deploy them, are made 
available and sustained over many years.  In this case, the role of biofuels in the 
future will look broadly like the EIA Energy Outlook projections published in 
2009 and 2010.   
There are possibilities for a different kind of future.  A global climate 
agreement, completion of the Doha round of negotiations, another spike in energy 
prices, or the emergence of a new disruptive technology could all create 
conditions for tighter alignment of interests among the IADs leading to more 
aggressive policy measures to promote biofuels.  It remains difficult to predict 
how this scenario would play out in detail, but one prediction that would certainly 
be true is that biofuels will need to be made more sustainable. 
Multiple organizations with a range of stakeholders have joined to create a 
scheme of criteria and indicators to ensure biofuels sustainable development.  
Research and development on second generation biofuels is underway, and if 
successful will largely eliminate the drawbacks associated with first generation 
fuels.  The technologies with the largest present following are algae biodiesel, 
cellulosic ethanol and biobutanol.  The success of these technologies in mitigating 
the concerns with first generation biofuels does not guarantee success in the 
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market place but is a prerequisite for any significant role in the world‟s energy 
future. 
In summary, I make the following conclusions:  
 The IAD framework is a useful construct to look at the full suite of 
issues and players in the biofuels debate.  Through the analysis in this 
thesis that characterized the nature of these action arenas and the 
forces that drive them, I have created a framework for understanding 
biofuel policy drivers that will shape the future of biofuels.  
 This set of action arenas will likely be a sufficient set for analysis well 
into the future.  While new policy drivers could emerge, they are 
unlikely to appear inside an action arena other than those mentioned in 
this thesis. It is hard to see how another substantial action arena can 
arise that is as important as those I have assessed.  It is thus more 
likely, new policy drivers will be subsumed into one of these arenas.  
For example, greentech, land use change or energy security do not 
have their own action arenas.  Considerations arising around these 
issue would likely be subsumed into the UNFCCC or US Federal 
Government.  
 A broad conclusion from this analysis is that a compelling case for 
supporting corn ethanol based on its ability to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and improve national energy security cost effectively is yet 
to be made.  The only meaningful source of support is coming from 
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the political demands from the agricultural sector.  The scientific and 
economic case for corn ethanol has not been made.  Even within 
agriculture,  sector divisions are becoming more important between 
agribusiness and rural income supporters.  It‟s impossible to predict 
how the tensions among the action arenas will be resolved.  But it is 
instructive to note, that there is at the moment, no biofuel that is 
rapidly progressing towards large scale commercialization.   
 There are significant issues with first generation biofuels that limit 
their desirability as fossil fuels substitutes. This includes, but is not 
limited to,  energy balance, net emissions savings, land-use change, 
biodiversity loss,  water competition, food versus fuel, and rising grain 
prices.   
 Completing the Doha round of negotiations would significantly change 
the landscape for biofuels, as a core mechanism for supporting farmers 
during weak grain prices would be removed.   The WTO negotiations 
were stalled over most of the first half of 2010, but by late July 
Director-General Pascal Lamy was reporting a “new dynamic” with 
hopes that progress can still be made.  If the DOHA round is 
completed based on the current draft of the agricultural section, deep 
cuts in agriculture subsidies will be required in the US and Europe.   
 An International agreement to substantially reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions could also change the landscape for biofuels, but new 
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legislation looks unlikely in the near future.  In the US Senate the 
Kerry-Lieberman climate bill to commit the US to GHG reduction 
targets is stalled with little evidence that will change in 2010.  In the 
absence of a US climate bill, there will be little drive coming from 
policy for substantial changes globally and in the US driven by climate 
considerations.   
 Both grain and oil markets are likely to remain volatile with oil prices 
trending higher than early in the decade, but there is no indication that 
either will be sufficiently unsettled to be a defining driver of new 
policy.  
 Even though many hoped biofuels would be contributing to 
greenhouse gas reductions and greater energy security by now, there is 
little prospect for a significant contribution in the near term without 
greater alignment among the action arenas.  In the absence of greater 
alignment, business as usual usually will prevail, and the future role of 
biofuels will look much like EIA projections.  A role that is not 
material. 
 Greater alignment could result from a number of factors and propel 
biofuels toward a more important future.  The details of that future are 
also unpredictable except that biofuels will need to be more 
sustainable.    
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